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Abstract 
Spillover Effects in Financial and International Development 
John Dogbey 
 
            The main objective of this dissertation is to explore some possible externalities that exist 
in the international context in the areas of finance and development economics. Chapter one is an 
introduction to this study. Chapter two examines contagion in exchange market pressure, 
currency crisis and currency stability. In this chapter I test whether exchange market pressure, in 
general, is contagious and proceed to test separately for contagion in currency crisis and currency 
stability. I construct an index of exchange market pressure for a panel of 118 countries and 
choose a threshold from which positive or negative deviations denote currency crisis and 
currency stability respectively.  
            The need to test for contagion in currency stability is to find out whether contagion is 
only a crises phenomenon. Currency crisis and currency stability spread by geography, trade and 
financial markets. Using spatial econometric models and constructing the appropriate trade and 
geography weight matrixes, I estimate the magnitude of the contagion by trade and geography 
respectively. I find that both transmission mechanisms do significantly transmit currency crisis 
and currency stability, but trade is more contagious than geography alone. I also find that 
currency stability is more contagious than currency stability. The results also suggest that trade 
channel is solely responsible for contagious currency crises that are not regional while the 
combination of the trade and geography channels of transmission are responsible for the 
prevalent nature of regional contagious currency crises. 
            In chapter three I test for contagion in financial development both in levels and in change 
of financial development. The main measure of financial development considered for this 
analysis is domestic banking, but I use banking development and stock market development in 
some cases for robustness checks.  I define domestic banking development as domestic credit to 
the private sector as a percentage of GDP. I explain contagion channels of geography, trade and 
financial linkages and, using spatial econometric models, test for these for a panel of 98 
countries for the geography and trade regressions and a panel of 30 countries (OECD countries) 
for the financial linkages regression. The results show that financial development and change of 
financial development are contagious of almost the same magnitude. I also find that the greatest 
channel of contagion is financial linkages followed closely by trade and geography. The results 
also suggest that other control variables such as bureaucratic quality and legal environment are 
important for financial development. 
            In chapter four, I empirically investigate why ethno-linguistic fractionalization has not 
dissipated in African countries. This is based on the idea that if trade spreads economic events 
across countries that engage in trade, why do we not have a single or few dominant language(s) 
spreading through the African continent? Similarly, why does geography not help propagate such 
things as a lingua in Africa?  
          The chapter explains that one of the main factors that have perpetuated ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization in Africa is colonial rule. Countries and or regions that have long years of 
colonial rule may be fractionalized than countries and regions with shorter years of colonial rule. 
Second, colonial barriers have helped perpetuate the fractionalization by limiting trade among 
African countries, even in the face of increasing globalization. I investigate this in a regression 
that measures colonial rule as the number of years a country has been colonized while 
  
 
controlling for other determinants of ethno-linguistic fractionalization. In chapter five, I 
summarize the conclusions of the study. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction, Review of Literature and Dissertation Overview 
1.1. Introduction 
The global economy has seen a lot of spillovers usually referred to as economic contagion. The 
term “spillover” or “contagion” in an international context means shocks coming from a related 
country or an event that affects most or all countries in the world. Such events obviously include 
currency crises and financial crises such as credit freezes. Other less conspicuous contagious 
events are currency stability, and the spread of or the evolution of a common language or trade 
language among societies. 
          Chiodo and Owyang (2002) define currency crisis as a speculative attack on a country‟s 
currency brought about by agents attempting to alter their portfolio by buying another currency 
with the currency of the domestic country.  There are three generations of currency crises and 
four factors that cause and exacerbate currency crises namely domestic debt, pegged exchange rate, 
expectations, and the state of financial markets. 
            For the first generation model, Pesenti and Tille (2000) explain that when governments 
have huge debts under fixed exchange rate regimes, it makes economic agents doubt the 
government‟s ability to sustain the peg and hence sell the local currency to hold foreign currency 
against possible devaluation. This is also possible during government bailouts as pointed out by 
Calvo and Mendoza (1996). 
            The second generation model explains that geographic neighbors, trade partners and the 
world‟s financial markets are responsible for the spread of currency crises. Pesenti and Tille 
(2000) explain that when foreign investors expect devaluations, they will ask a high premium  
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which increases borrowing cost and limits credit opportunities and governments abandon the 
peg. The third generation model explains that because the banks and the financial markets are 
fragile, increases in interest rates makes firms‟ default rate high, and this becomes lending 
constraints. Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996) explain the twin problem between the banking sector 
and currency crises. 
            Financial development is believed to have played a great role in the economic growth of 
many countries during the recent trend towards globalization. Stulz (2005) points out that high 
risks of expropriation and thus insecure property rights limit financial development and the 
ability of a country to take advantage of financial globalization. Johnson, McMillan and 
Woodruff (2002) show the positive relationship between private sector enforcement, financial 
development and investment and growth.  
             Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2005) show that the effect of liberalization on economic 
growth is greater if a country starts from above average level of financial development. Also, 
Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad and Siegel (2007) find that domestic banking development is one of 
the important requirements in exploiting growth opportunities. Hermes and Lensink (1999) 
explore the relationship between growth, FDI and financial development and conclude that 
financial development is one of the prerequisites for a country to realize the full growth potential 
of FDI.  
           Aghion, Howitt, and Mayer-Fulkes (2003) provide an empirical evidence supporting the 
Schumpeterian Theory of Convergence and conclude  that countries with a certain critical level 
of financial development have a likelihood of converging to the world–technology frontier and 
that other countries have far lower long-run growth.  
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            Ethno-linguistic fractionalization has received a lot of attention in the development 
literature. Specifically, most people believe that it is one of the problems that contribute to the 
demise of the African continent in particular. Poor institutions are primarily responsible for 
fractionalization in Africa. In other words, by controlling for institutions the negative impact of 
institutions on growth disappears. Colonial artificial institutions are also responsible for the 
limited trade in Africa and the resultant poor growth (Leeson, 2005; Easterly, 2001; Easterly and 
Levine, 1997).  
           The relationship between colonial rule and growth has also been explored. Different 
measures of colonization have been found to account for poor growth in Africa. These measures 
include the length of colonial rule, colonial penetration and colonial history. 
        
 1.2. Literature Review 
The literature review consists of brief review of the empirical literature of each topic and a 
discussion of my contribution to the existing literature. In the currency crises literature, Edwards 
(2000) employ VAR to investigate volatility contagion. Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1996) 
and Glick and Rose (1999) employ probit models to address contagion in currency crises. The 
later two literature use dummies as the measures of currency crisis and hence probit estimation 
procedures to find the presence and or magnitude of the contagion. 
            This is the first study that uses a spatial econometric model to study contagion in 
currency crises. The hallmark of chapter 2 is that it attempts to measure trade and geographic 
channels of currency crises transmission separately as well as examine the effects of economic 
fundamentals on currency crises (the extent to which economic fundamentals aggravate currency 
crises in a country). This model has the advantage of accounting for multi-directional effects as 
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opposed to unidirectional effects captured in the conventional econometrics models. In addition, 
it is also convenient for situations where spatial dependence exists in the data.              
            This study produce evidence supporting the hypothesis that trade is contagious in 
transmitting currency crises and or exchange market pressure from one country to the other and 
that it does so to a larger extent than existing findings. Second, this chapter also examines 
whether contagion is only crises phenomenon. It shows that there is contagion during strong and 
stable currency periods, the impact through trade and geographic linkages is positive and that 
trade linkages have a larger magnitude in this case than during currency crises. For geography, 
the magnitude is same as during currency crises.              
            Also, this study examines whether macroeconomic channels are economically significant 
in explaining currency crises or exchange market pressure. The findings suggest that trade has 
been the dominant factor to which geography is next. These two channels explain why during 
currency crises, some countries are infected while some are not. For example, it explains why 
during the Asian Crisis in 1997-98 countries like Russia and some Asian countries were prey to 
the endemic crisis, but countries like Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore were not infected even 
though they are in the same region. Or, why the Tequila Crisis in Latin America during 1994-95 
infected other Latin American countries and Hungary but did not affect Chile. 
            This chapter poses the question, given that a country experiences currency crises or some 
level of exchange market pressure, what percentage of it is attributable to trade channels or 
geographic channels? 
            In the financial development literature, a lot of studies use financial development as 
exogenous variable to either explain growth, FDI or other economic variables. Much more 
related to this study which endogenizes financial development is Koubi (2008). In his study, he 
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controlled for initial per-capita GDP, legal environment and bureaucratic quality to find how 
these variables determined financial development. 
            This study tests whether the amount of private credit being advanced to the private sector 
in one country depends on what is prevailing in the private credit markets of other countries. 
Second, it attempts to find out what the transmission mechanisms are and what the magnitude of 
the contagion is in each case. The Schumpeterian theory of convergence propounds that 
countries beyond a certain level of financial development converge to the world technology 
frontier. This chapter therefore examines how countries attain the necessary level of financial 
development needed for growth convergence. It identifies three channels of contagion in 
financial development namely financial linkages, trade and geography. 
            My results suggest that each of these is a significant channel through which financial 
development can spread from one country to the other. Specifically, it finds which channel is 
more effective and more responsible for the spread and growth of financial development in 
countries. Whiles no single channel seem to be the sole means of transmission, my results show 
that financial linkages is a more effective means followed closely by trade and geography.  
            The ethno-linguistic fractionalization literature also comprises of quite a lot of papers that 
use ethno-linguistic fractionalization as an exogenous variable. One related study that 
endogenizes ethno-linguistic fractionalization is Leeson (2005), but it is not an empirical study. 
           This study empirically examines how ethno-linguistic fractionalization is determined and 
explains why it seems to be perpetuated in some regions of the world, specifically on the 
continent of Africa. 
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1.3. Dissertation Overview 
This study focuses on economic contagion in the areas of financial and economic development. 
In other words, the main objective of this dissertation is to explore some possible externalities 
that exist in the international context in the areas of finance and economic development.  
            The dissertation uses spatial econometric models to measure contagion. Spatial 
econometric models are especial appropriate and useful when there exists spatial dependence in 
the data under consideration. The two types of spatial models are spatial error model and spatial 
autoregressive model. Spatial autoregressive model (SAR) specifies a country‟s dependent 
variable as a function of the weighted value of the dependent variable of its neighbors or 
partners. It takes lags over geographic distance. Spatial error model (SEM) specifies the error 
term of a country‟s dependable variable as a function of the weighted value of the dependent 
variable of its geographic neighbors or partners. The dissertation also uses OLS specifications as 
well as seeming unrelated models to estimate certain variables. The rest of the dissertation is 
organized as follows: chapter 2, 3, and 4 presents the empirical work and chapter 5 summarizes 
the findings of the study.  
             Chapter 2 looks at contagion in the area of exchange market pressure. It asks whether 
exchange market pressure, currency crisis, and currency stability are contagious. Decomposing 
geographic channels and trade channels of currency crises provides the ability to answer two 
questions in the currency crises literature. The first is why are currency crises regional? The 
second is why do some countries not within geographical locations of currency crises zones get 
infected while some closer do not get infected? For example, why the Tequila Crisis in Latin 
America during 1994-95 infected Hungary and other Latin American countries but did not affect 
Chile?  
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            The chapter finds that because the geographic channel is not as strong as the trade 
channel, a distant country that has trade links with the infected country is more likely to be 
infected than a neighbor who has no trade links with the infected country. Also crises are 
regional because neighbors do have some minimal trade linkages and this together with the 
geography linkages produces an amalgamating effect that is usually bigger than the magnitude of 
trade linkages alone. Also he found that contagion is not only crises phenomenon but is more 
pronounced during stable and strong currency period, especially by trade.  
            Chapter 3 studies contagion in financial development, exploring the possibilities of 
contagion in financial development both at levels and change of financial development. The 
chapter answers the question how do countries attain the necessary level of financial 
development needed for growth convergence? It identified three channels of financial 
development namely financial linkages, trade and geography. 
           By geography, financial development spreads through economic unions and through the 
activities of common lenders to regional blocks.  Through the activities of institutional investors 
economic unions such as the EU can increase the level of financial development of its members 
Cvetanovic (2006). Financial linkages could spread financial development either directly or 
indirectly. Directly, financial linkages can take the form of establishment of foreign banks and 
financial instructions. Indirectly, domestic lenders have the opportunity to learn the expertise 
(such as the ability to distinguish good credit risks from bad credit risks) from these foreign 
lenders and hence be in a better position to advance more credit. Competition with the foreign 
banks for customers can also results in a higher level of financial development.  Finally trade 
liberalization and globalization leads to competition with the outside world making domestic 
entrepreneurs put pressure on the financial sector for credit.   
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            Specifically the chapter finds which channel is more effective and more responsible for 
the spread and growth of financial development in countries and shows that financial linkages 
are the most effective channel followed by trade and geography respectively. This means that for 
poor countries to attain the minimum requirement level of financial development needed for 
growth convergence financial linkages will play very crucial role. 
             Chapter 4 investigates why Africa has not experienced contagion in the area of a lingua 
franca (a common language used by speakers of different languages). Specifically it finds the 
limitations to contagion in lingua franca in Africa posing the question whether ethno- linguistic 
fractionalization and linguistic fractionalization are contagious and are perpetuated in Africa. It 
attempts to answer why, unlike other countries and continents, no single language has spread 
through the whole region of Africa. Further, the chapter finds possible explanations for the 
situation of Africa and makes some policy recommendations based on the findings of the 
chapter. 
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Chapter 2 
Currency Crises and Exchange Market Pressure – Contagion, Trade and Geography 
2.1. Introduction 
Contagion in currency crises has received much attention both theoretically and empirically. This 
follows the increasing regional experience of currency crises around the world. For example, the 
Russian Crisis of 1998 followed the Asian Crisis of 1997, which started with an attack on the 
Thailand baht and spread to South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines. Also the 
Mexican Crisis of 1994 was followed by the Latin America Tequila Crisis associated with 
speculative attacks in countries including Argentina, Venezuela, Peru, Brazil, Thailand, Hong 
Kong, Hungary, and the Philippines. 
            Economic contagion can be defined in different ways including the following as stated by 
Edwards (2000): (1) global disturbances that affect most countries in the world; (2) shocks 
coming from a related country; (3) a situation where the extent and magnitude of the 
international transmission of shocks exceeds what was expected by market participants. The first 
and second definitions are the ones considered for discussing contagion in this chapter.  
            Chiodo and Owyang (2002) define a currency crisis as a speculative attack on a country‟s 
currency brought about by agents attempting to alter their portfolio by buying another currency 
with the currency of the domestic country.  There are three generations of currency crises. 
Krugman (1979), Flood and Garber (1984) and Dooley (1997) developed the first generation 
models; Obstfeld (1994) developed the second generation models, and Krugman (1999) and 
Aghion, Bacchetta, and Banerjee (2000) developed the third generation models. Chiodo and 
Owyang (2002) discovered four factors, namely domestic debt, pegged exchange rate, 
expectations, and the state of financial markets, that cause and exacerbate currency crises. 
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                  Pesenti and Tille (2000) also discuss some generations of currency crises and related 
them to the Asian crises. In addition to what previous studies say about the first generations 
model they state that even if a country does not run large fiscal deficits it can still experience 
currency crises when financial difficulties necessitate government bailouts. They also explain 
that chronic current account deficits make countries more vulnerable because of dependency on 
foreign capital. Relating to the Asian crises, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore had low debts 
and current account surpluses as opposed to Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia and South Korea, 
who had huge current account deficits in the 1990‟s.  
             The second generation model explains that geographic neighbors, trade partners and the 
world‟s financial markets are responsible for the spread of currency crises. Pesenti and Tille 
(2000) explain that when foreign investors expect devaluations, they will ask a high premium 
which increases borrowing cost and limits credit opportunities and governments abandon the 
peg. The third generation model explains that because the banks and the financial markets are 
fragile, increases in interest rates make firms‟ default rate high, and this becomes a lending 
constraint. Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996) explain the twin problem between the banking sector 
and currency crises. 
            The contribution of this chapter is that it attempts to measure trade and geographic 
channels of currency crises transmission separately as well as examine the effects of economic 
fundamentals on currency crises (the extent to which economic fundamentals aggravate currency 
crises in a country). Edwards (2000) employ VAR to investigate volatility contagion while 
Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1996) and Glick and Rose (1999) employ probit models to 
address contagion in currency crises. This is the first study that uses a spatial econometric model 
to study contagion in currency crises. This model has the advantage of accounting for multi-
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directional effects as opposed to unidirectional effects captured in the conventional econometrics 
models. In addition, it is also convenient for situations where spatial dependence exists in the 
data.              
            This chapter produces evidence supporting the existing hypothesis that trade is 
contagious in transmitting currency crises and or exchange market pressure from one country to 
the other and that it does so to a larger extent than existing findings. Second, this chapter also 
examines whether contagion is only crises phenomenon. It shows that there is contagion during 
strong and stable currency periods, the impact through trade and geographic linkages is positive 
and that trade linkages have a larger magnitude in this case than during currency crises. For 
geography, the magnitude is same as during currency crises.              
            Also, this chapter examines whether macroeconomic channels are economically 
significant in explaining currency crises or exchange market pressure. The findings suggest that 
trade has been the dominant factor to which geography is next. These two channels explain why 
during currency crises, some countries are infected while some are not. For example, it explains 
why during the Asian Crisis in 1997-98 countries like Russia and some Asian countries lay pray 
to the endemic crisis, but countries like Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore were not infected 
even though they are in the same region. Or, why the Tequila Crisis in Latin America during 
1994-95 infected other Latin American countries and Hungary but did not affect Chile? 
            This chapter poses the question, given that a country experiences currency crises or some 
level of exchange market pressure, what percentage of it is attributable to trade channels or 
geographic channels?             
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            In section 2, I present some theoretical explanations of the transmission mechanisms; 
present my methodology in section 3 followed by my results and interpretation in section 4 and 
conclusion in section 5. 
 
2.2. Channels of Transmission 
While all the three generations of currency crises agree on financial markets as a channel of 
transmission and have also spelt out the macro-economic fundamentals that matter in explaining 
currency crises, the second generation models of currency crises identify trade and geography in 
particular as contagious channels. This chapter therefore explains three channels of contagion 
namely geography, trade and financial markets. 
 
2.2.1. Geography        
  Chiodo and Owyang (2002) pointed out some channels of transmission of currency crises 
including common events affecting geographic neighbors. These events include wars or oil price 
shocks or other events common to a geographical location that could affect the exchange markets 
of countries located in that area. For example, when there is war in one or two West African 
countries, this may lead not only to speculative attack on the currencies of the countries involved 
but on the currencies of neighboring countries as well. 
            Moreover, countries in the same region tend to belong to economic unions and may be 
easily infected by events from a member country.  For example, Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) 
documented that if Mexico devalues and a diversified investor sells his equity and bond 
holdings, he may do the same with respect to Argentina. This could be classified as a geographic 
channel since it originates from the effect of a common factor (lender in this case) on that region. 
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2.2.2. Trade 
Another channel identified as a transmission mechanism of currency crises is trade. This trade 
linkage may hold even if the countries involved do not engage in bilateral trade. Kaminsky and 
Reinhart (2000), for example, proved that bilateral trade in itself has not been a major force 
behind recent crises. They gave an example of the Asian Crisis, in which the bilateral trade 
between the countries involved was relatively very small, to prove this. This finding, 
notwithstanding, does not overrule the fact that bilateral trade may magnify the spread of 
currency crises. This will happen when a trade partner devalues its currency and competition for 
exports necessitates the other to do the same. 
            The most widely accepted trade channel is the competition for exports in a third country‟s 
market by other countries. If one of these countries devalues, it is most likely to cause the others 
to do the same. Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000), however, showed that it is not always so unless 
the competitors are all exporting same products to this third market. A more general way to see 
this will be a competition for exports (of all export goods produced by each country) in a global 
market. Devaluation in some countries can increase their export or export growth and cause 
countries that produce similar exports to devalue as well. With increasing globalization, the 
effect of a global market may even be more pronounced as this covers competition for all export 
goods and services. What is necessary here is same or similar export goods for the countries 
involved. 
            Thus this trade linkage may work if there is a high bilateral trade between two countries, 
one of which is experiencing a crisis, and or a competition (for exports) between countries hit by 
currency crises and other countries in a third-party market (in this study global market) or both 
trade forms.  
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2.2.3. Financial Markets 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) examined two financial market channels. First, a common bank 
creditor which serves as a regional block to other countries can transmit currency crises. This is 
linked with trade as countries which engage in trade need strong financial market 
interconnections and facilities. When this common creditor country is faced with huge 
nonperforming loans in one country it may lend less in that country as well as the other customer 
countries. 
            The second financial market channel has to do with mutual funds and cross-market 
hedging in which globally diversified investors decide to sell their bond and equity holding of 
one country as the other country (related by geography or some other common characteristic) 
devalues its currency. For example, Baig and Ilan (1999) found evidence of cross-border 
contagion in currency and equity markets. 
            Empirical investigation of this channel has posed a problem: mutual fund and cross 
hedging were not in existence until the 90‟s. To address this, the chapter uses the trade channel 
as a proxy for the financial markets channel. By national income accounting identities, trade 
flows are equivalent to capital flows. In other words, trade in goods and services are equivalent 
to trade in financial assets. Thus based on this identity, both channels should produce same 
results. 
 
2.3. Methodology 
2.3.1. Model 
This study uses spatial autoregressive model (SAR) and spatial error model (SEM). SAR 
specifies a country‟s currency crisis as a function of the weighted value of the currency crises of 
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it neighbors. SEM models the error term of a country‟s currency crisis as a function of the 
weighted value of its geographic neighbors‟ currency crises. These are similar to the time series 
ARMA and MA models except that they use distance lags rather than time lags. Anselin (1988), 
Anselin and Moreno (2003) as well as LeSage and Pace (2004) explain these models extensively. 
             To use the above approach, I first test for the presence of spatial dependence using the 
Lagrangian Multiplier (LM) test which shows whether OLS estimates would be biased and also 
helps chose the best spatial model (the one with the largest LM t-statistic) that can remove the 
unobserved spatial dependence.  I used both models in my analysis, but based on my tests, SEM 
is best suited for all the regression even though the results for SAR are very close. I will provide 
my results based on both.  
           These models are specified below: 
:SAR  
 tttt XWYY                                                                       (1) 
:SEM  
                 ttt
XY   ;   ttt W                                                        (2) 
Or, for regressions that use lagged dependent variables, 
           tttt YXY   1 ;   ttt W                                                (3) 
 
where W  is an NXN weight matrix with respect trade or geography; tX  is a vector of controls 
variables, tY  is an NX1 vector of measures of the dependent variables,  and   are the spatial 
autoregressive and spatial error coefficients respectively (which represent the percentage of a 
country‟s dependent variable accounted for by the dependent variable of its trade linkages or 
geographic neighbors), and t  and t  are  NX1 matrixes of iid random errors. 
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All of these models are run in MATLAB. 
 
2.3.2. Measuring the Dependent Variables 
My index of exchange market pressure (EMP), used to compute my dependent variables, is 
constructed as a weighted average of reserve changes and exchange rate changes similar to the 
way it is constructed in Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996). I construct my index of EMP as below: 
 
)]%(%)(%[ Gitititit rreEMP                                                                         (4) 
 
where ite  represents the price of a DM in country i ‟s currency at time t; itr  is country i ‟s  
 
international reserves, Gitr  is German international reserves and  and  are weights. My choice 
of Germany as the center country follows the reasoning used in Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz  
 
(1996); the currency of Germany had been strong throughout the post war era. 
 
             Based on the above I construct different measures of currency crisis and currency 
stability. The conventional method is to find a benchmark EMP value and assign the currency 
crisis a dummy when a country‟s EMP in a particular year exceeds this threshold EMP. I used 
this index also in my analysis to help me compare my results with similar papers. Below is how 
this dummy is defined: 
 
otherwise
EMPif
Crisis EMPEMPitti
 




5.1
0
1
,                                                  (5)
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where, EMP  is the sample mean and EMP  is the sample standard deviation. One limitation I 
realized with this index is that it does not tell much about the severity of the crisis, since it gives 
the same value to all countries experiencing high EMP‟s. This can either overvalue or 
undervalue the magnitude of the spread of currency crises. To make up for this, I expressed 
currency crises in two ways: one as the actual excess EMP over the threshold and the other as the 
excess as a percentage of the threshold as shown in equation 3 and 4 respectively. For EMP‟s 
equal to or less than the threshold, the crises index is zero since that is an indication of low 
exchange market pressure or stability. 
 
itCisis )5.1( EMPEMPitEMP                                                                               (6) 
itCisis 100*
)5.1(
)]5.1([
EMPEMP
EMPEMPitEMP




                                                                 (7) 
 
             Using just the excess EMP or equation (6) has not changed my results much, but I decide 
to maintain the  definition  based on equation (7) above because it rationalizes the currency crisis 
index both across years and across countries as each index is not just a deviation from the 
threshold but also the percentage deviation from the threshold. Only years with currency crises 
of five or more, based on this measure, were studied. This is because Eichengreen, Rose and 
Wyplosz (1996) found that contagion is not likely to take effect when just one or a few 
speculative attacks have occurred. My crisis years are thus, 2003, 2001, 1998, 1992, 1990, 1988 
and 1987. For simplicity and comparison I used same years for regressions using other 
dependent variables in this study. 
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            I also construct a currency stability index as another dependent variable in addition to 
exchange market pressure and currency crises. For every country for which the excess EMP over 
the threshold is negative, I interpret it as a stable and strong currency. Since the closer an EMP is 
to the threshold means it is closer to crisis than a stability, larger negative deviations mean a 
more stable and stronger currency than smaller negative deviations. As a result I used the same 
measure as above but took the absolute value. For example, two countries with excess EMP as a 
percentage of the threshold as -5 and -10 will now have stability measures as 5 and 10 
respectively. For EMP equal to or greater than the threshold, the stability index is zero since that 
is an indication of high exchange market pressure or crises. In similar notation as above, 
 
)5.1( EMPEMPitit EMPStability                                                                         (8)                                                                         
 
100*
)5.1(
]5.1([
EMPEMP
EMPEMPit
it
EMP
Stability




                                                             (9) 
 
2.3.3. Constructing the Weight Matrices 
The weight matrix for the geographic channel is based on first order contiguity. A country will 
only give a positive weight to another country if it is its neighbor, otherwise a zero weight. The 
spatial weight given by a country to its neighbor is expressed as the inverse of the total number 
of neighbors the country has based on first-order contiguity (usually referred to as the “queen 
case” in spatial econometrics). The weights are row-standardized for each of the countries so that 
each country‟s total weight given equals 1. This is represented in matrix notations below: 
 19 
 

























nj
jn
nj
jn
j
j
j
j
W








...
...
...
...
...
1
1
1
1
2
                j =1, 2, ….n.                        (10)                                               
  
neighborsarejandi
otherwise
countryif
ji




0
1
                             (11) 
 
            The trade weight matrix must capture the theoretical explanation of trade linkages. This 
should reflect competition for exports between countries that engage in bilateral trade and or 
competition of countries for exports in third country‟s market or the global market. The idea is 
that if any of these competitors suffers from currency crises (or has a strong currency), it can 
easily spillover to other competitors. As a result, my first trade weight matrix uses bilateral 
export between countries as in Leeson and Sobel (2006). In this case, country A gives a weight 
equal to the ratio of his export to each country to its total exports. In matrix form, 
 

























nj
nn
nj
nj
j
j
j
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
W
...
...
...
...
...
1
1
1
11
1               for j =1, 2, ….n.                                      (12) 
 
where jiX ,  
is country i ‟s export to country j . Since a country cannot send exports to itself, the 
principal diagonal is zero. 
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            The above matrix is however not enough to capture the trade weight since countries 
which do not engage in bilateral trade may still be infected by currency crises in non-trade 
partner countries. I therefore construct another weight matrix in which a country would assign a 
weight to other countries based on the magnitude and growth rate differential of their export 
shares of GDP and merged it with the above.  
            For this weight matrix, country i  finds the difference between its export share of GDP or 
growth rate of export share of GDP and gives a weight directly corresponding to this difference 
to all countries for which this value is positive. Otherwise, country i gives a weight 
corresponding to the inverse of the absolute value of this value. This is represented in matrix 
notation below: 
 














































)(
..
)()(
....
....
)(
..
)()(
)(
..
)()(
21
2
2
2
22
2
21
1
1
1
12
1
11
2
ni
nn
ni
n
ni
n
i
n
ii
i
n
ii
XX
XX
XX
XX
XX
XX
XX
XX
XX
XX
XX
XX
XX
XX
XX
XX
XX
XX
W   for i =1, 2..n               (11) 
 
where iX  can either be interpreted as a country‟s export share of GDP or the growth rate of the 
country‟s export share of GDP. Exports shares account for the size of countries economy which 
is important in determining competition for exports between countries. 
Let ijji dXX  , so that 1111 dXX   and   ijji dXX )(     
 
Then for 
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And for  
jijiij
ji
jiij
ji
XXXXd
XX
XXd
XX





;
0
0
1
 
             Thus this weight matrix rules out the possibility of two countries having exactly the 
same export share of GDP. It is only on the principal diagonal that we must have zeroes since 
each country's exports share of GDP deviation with respect to itself is zero ( 0iid ). This 
simplifies the above weight matrix to: 
 




























in
nn
in
n
in
n
i
n
ii
i
n
ii
d
d
d
d
d
d
d
d
d
d
d
d
d
d
d
d
d
d
W
..
....
....
..
..
21
2
2
2
22
2
12
1
1
1
21
1
11
2                            for i =1, 2, …n 
                                                                                                                                        
            For all countries country i ‟s export share of GDP (or growth rate of) is smaller than, it 
will give them a weight directly related to these deviations. On the other hand for all countries 
country i ‟s export share of GDP or growth rate of export share of GDP is higher than, the 
deviation will be negative and hence country i  will give them a weight that equals the inverse of 
the absolute value of the deviation. This ensures that all countries with positive deviations have 
higher weights than those with negative deviations with respect to country i .   
            The final trade weight matrix takes the following forms:  
1. 2W , using export share of GDP  
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2. 2W , using growth rate of export share of GDP 
3.  A linear combination of  2W  in (1) above with 1W  
4.  A linear combination of  2W  in (2) above with 1W  
This chapter uses all the different combinations above for robustness and also tests 1W to see if 
bilateral trade alone is a sufficient trade channel for contagion.  
 
2.3.4. Independent Variables 
In line with the theoretical framework and based on availability of data for the sample chosen, 
the following control variables are employed. They are mostly domestic fundamentals including 
the current account as a share of GDP, growth rate of domestic credit, the CPI, real GDP growth 
rate, money stock (M2) and unemployment rate. The choice of these independent variables is 
based on the theoretical framework explained earlier. All these variables were included as 
deviations from German values as it is the center country. 
 
2.3.5. Data  
The study covers a period of twenty years from 1985 to 2005. The choice of this period is a 
result of the bandwagon of currency crises that hit the world in recent years especially the 
1990‟s. Starting from the European Exchange Rate Mechanism collapse between 1992 and 1993 
to the Asian crisis and the Russian default in 1998, there are many cases to consider within the 
period under study. A panel of 119 countries is chosen for this study.  
            Data is taken from different sources including the World Bank Databases (World 
Development Indicator), the IMF databases (IFS and DOS) and the World Fact Book. Detailed 
description of the data is in Appendix 1.  
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2.4. Results 
My results confirm the existing theoretical framework suggesting that trade and geography are 
the transmission mechanisms of currency crises. The findings also support the hypothesis that 
trade is the most dominant channel of contagion in currency crises. Furthermore, my results 
suggest that currency stabilities in countries can also propagate to other countries through the 
same trade links in a higher magnitude than does currency crises. The magnitude of the spread 
through geography though is the same for currency crises and currency stabilities in this study.  
            Exchange Market Pressure (EMP) is also found to be contagious through geography and 
trade links. I present my results in Table 1.1 – Table 1.6 (Table 1.4 and Table 1.5 provide results 
for robustness checks using different dependent variables). Though I run the regression for both 
models, based on my LM test SEM results are best for this analysis except for the dummy 
dependent variables which uses SAR. 
            The results suggest that country‟s catch 0.24 of their EMP from their geographic 
neighbors. This is shown as lambda in Table 1.1, column 3, and it is significant at 1%.  The trade 
channel nevertheless is of a much higher magnitude; 0.35. This is also found in column 6 
(column 7 reports similar result using a different weight matrix for robustness checks) of Table 
1.1. The lagged level of EMP is not significant in all of the regressions, meaning that exchange 
market pressure can produce surprising shocks. A country with a low EMP the previous period 
can suddenly have a high EMP in the current period. 
             Table 1.2 presents the results for currency crisis. The study shows that countries catch 
0.15 of their currency crisis from geographic neighbors (shown as lambda in column 3). For 
trade, this coefficient is between 0.14-0.17 depending on the trade weight matrix used (shown as 
lambda in column 6 and 7). This means that trade linkages are more important than geographic 
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measures in explaining contagion in currency crises. The measure of currency crisis used here 
was based on equation (4). The results for a similar measure, based on equation (3) are also 
reported in Table 1. 4 for robustness checks.             
            The results for the measures of currency stability are quite interesting. Lambda is larger 
for both trade and geography regressions than it is for the measures of currency crisis. Table 1.3 
presents the results of currency stability. For both measures of currency stability, lambda for the 
geography regression is 0.17. This is found in column 3 of Table 1.3 and Table 1.5. It implies 
that countries catch 0.17 of the strength of the currency of their geographic neighbors. For the 
trade regression, lambda is between 0.45-0.49 using the measure based on equation (5). This can 
be found in column 6 and 7 of Table 1.3. The results for a similar measure, based on equation 
(5), are also reported in Table 1.5 for robustness checks.             
            Also, the result for the geographic channel and its lower magnitude than the trade channel 
is intuitive; when the trade effect becomes very large it can be enough to spread currency crises 
regardless of distance (for example the Russian default linked to the Asian Crisis and the Tequila 
Crisis infecting Hungary), but the combination of the geography effect and the trade effect 
produces a synergy that makes currency crises regional. That geographic channel alone is less 
strong and perhaps not enough could help answer questions like why during the Asian Crisis 
countries like Taiwan, Singapore and Malaysia were not infected or why during the Tequila 
Crisis Chile was not infected. Sometimes the trade effect between two distant countries could be 
bigger than the amalgamation of the trade and geography effects for two neighbors though the 
opposite is more prevalent as in current episodes. 
            All results are robust using different measures of dependent variables as well as different 
weight matrices for trade. The regression is also run for each of the years chosen for the study 
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and results for 1998, for example, are as follows: geography is accountable for 0.19 of a currency 
crisis, 0.14 of currency stability, and 0.17 of an exchange market pressure while trade is 
accountable for 0.35 of currency stability. All these results are significant at 5%, 10%, 5%, and 
1% respectively.  
            However compared to former studies, especially Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1996),  
who studied currency crises, trade linkages and macroeconomic channels, my results differ 
significantly using my measure of currency crisis but similar to theirs when dummy variables are 
used as in those studies. Table 1.6 shows the result when dummy variables were used for the 
measures based on equation (2). Rho, shown in column 4 is 0.053 for currency crisis which is 
close to the 0.08 produced by Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1996). Second, using this 
measure of currency crisis confirms my results above even though rho is just higher for this new 
measure. The results in Table 1.4 show that countries catch 0.07 of the currency crisis of their 
geographic neighbors and 0.13 of the currency stability of their geographic neighbors. The 
results are 0.053 and 0.31 respectively by trade partners and trade competitors. These are shown 
as rho in columns 2, 3, 4, and 5 respectively.  
            Comparing the trade linkages for currency crises and currency stabilities it is obvious that 
the later is of a higher magnitude than the former; almost three times larger (0.49 against 0.17). 
An obvious reason why the magnitude of the contagion is so high for the currency stability 
measure is that for countries trading with each other or competing in a third market for exports, 
one cannot decide to consistently devalue its currency when the currency of the others are strong 
due to the fear of potential retaliation and or a direct pressure exerted by these trading 
competitors to allow its currency to appreciate for a fair competition. For example, China 
receives increasing pressure from the U.S. in the form of calls for import barriers to allow the 
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yuan to appreciate as explained by Bown, Crowley, McCulloch, and Nakajima (2005). Currency 
crises, on the other hand, spread by indirect competition and have lower magnitude than the 
former. 
            Moreover, I have examined if bilateral trade alone is sufficient for contagion and found 
no such evidence. By using the bilateral trade weight matrix alone, no lambda in all regressions 
is significant. This finding is consistent with the claim of Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) that 
bilateral trade has not been a force behind recent crises. Lambda is significant when the weight 
matrices based on competition in a third-party market (global market) are used and most times 
higher when this weight is combined with the bilateral trade weight. This means that bilateral 
trade is neither necessary nor sufficient for contagion but can increase its magnitude.  
           This chapter does not investigate into how macroeconomic variables spread currency 
crises but used them as control variables to find out how they can affect a country‟s own 
currency crisis. For all of my macroeconomic variables controlled for, apart from unemployment 
(the coefficient of unemployment was 6% in all regressions in Table 1.1, but became 1% in 
Table 1.6 when dummy dependent variables are used), this chapter found some statistically but 
not economically significant as found by Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1996).  
             On the other hand, the  divergence in magnitude of my trade results from those by 
Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1996) and other empirical studies may largely be because my 
crisis measures account, not only for the existence of currency crisis but, also for its relative 
intensity as opposed to previous studies. Second, my trade weight matrix captures not only 
exports but also accounts for the size of a country‟s economy (GDP) as well the growth rate of 
exports. Furthermore, the spatial econometrics technique used accounts for multi-directional 
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effects as opposed to the conventional econometric models and it is also convenient for studying 
contagion of this kind, where spatial dependence exists in the data.    
 
2.5. Conclusion 
This chapter attempted to study contagion in currency crises and exchange market pressure by 
incorporating the geography weight matrix and also introducing a new dependent variable, 
currency stabilities, to the already existing empirical work. The results both confirm and improve 
upon the former studies in this area of study.   
            The chapter suggests that geographic measures are also very significant and are captured 
by certain unmeasured common shocks that are identified only with countries in a certain 
geographical location. It also explains that while the summation of geographic and trade 
channels of currency crises are responsible for the contagion in certain regions (which accounts 
for why larger percentage of the infection is regional), the high magnitude of the trade channel 
accounts for the spread of currency crises to other trade competitors outside the geographic 
location of the initial attack.  
             Second, though trade spreads currency crises, the positive effect it has during periods of 
currency stabilities are much larger (about three times more) than the adverse effects during 
crises. This may imply that the overall global effect of the trade linkages is not a zero sum or 
decreasing sum game but an increasing sum game.   
            For policy recommendation, this would suggest that trade should be encouraged as 
countries come to learn this findings. For geography, since countries cannot choose their 
neighbors, the only thing to do is to realize that what happens in the exchange market “next 
door” can affect you and hence the need to be prepared for it. One way to do this is to encourage 
 28 
 
strong economic unions that could help deal with such common adverse or favorable events as 
well as other unmeasured common shocks that hit the currency markets of regions around the 
world. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 29 
 
Table 1.1. Contagion- Exchange Market Pressure 
Geography 
 
Trade 
Trade Dependent  Variable Dependent  Variable 
Exchange Market 
Pressure (EMP) 
Exchange Market Pressure 
(EMP) 
 
 
 
Independent  
Variable 
 
 
 
Va  
SAR SEM 
SAR SEM 
 
Export growth 
and bilateral 
trade weight 
 
 
Exports  and 
bilateral trade 
weight 
 
Export 
growth and 
bilateral trade 
weight 
 
 
Exports and 
bilateral 
trade weight 
  
Constant 
 
 
Lambda 
 
 
Rho 
              
 
Lagged 
 EMP 
 
Current Account 
per  GDP  
(annual %) 
Domestic Credit 
per GDP growth  
(annual %) 
M2 – money and 
quasi money  to 
total reserve ratio 
 
CPI (annual %) 
 
GDP growth  
 (annual %) 
 
Unemployment 
 (annual %) 
 
Regional 
Dummies 
 
Island 
 
 
 
-3.15 
(0.670) 
 
… 
 
 
0.236*** 
(11.5) 
 
-0.010 
(0.72) 
 
0.113 
(0.862) 
 
0.004 
(0.364) 
 
0.042** 
(2.289) 
 
-0.006*** 
(-3.855) 
 
0.303*** 
(2.252) 
 
0.152 
(0.913) 
 
Yes 
 
-0.60 
(-0.20) 
 
 
2.24  
(-0.42.) 
 
0.243*** 
(11.77) 
 
… 
 
 
0.007 
(0.21) 
 
0.113 
(0.812) 
 
0.003 
(0.314) 
 
0.045*** 
(2.476) 
 
-0.006*** 
(-3.789) 
 
0.323** 
(2.334) 
 
0.180 
(1.067) 
 
Yes 
 
-1.588  
(-0.514) 
 
-3.44 
(-0.611) 
 
… 
 
 
0.322*** 
(4.26) 
 
-0.003 
(-0.089) 
 
0.147 
(1.063) 
 
0.004 
(0.451) 
 
0.042*** 
(2.246) 
 
-0.006*** 
(-3.600) 
 
0.249*** 
(1.795) 
 
0.125 
(0.739) 
 
Yes 
 
-0.857 
(-0.281) 
 
-3.436  
(-0.631) 
 
… 
 
 
0.375*** 
(5.333) 
 
-0.003  
(-0.097) 
 
0.181  
(1.311) 
 
0.004  
(0.444) 
 
0.041**  
(2.200) 
 
-0.006*** 
(-3.549) 
 
0.258** 
(1.888) 
 
0.154  
(0.909) 
 
Yes 
 
-1.158  
(-0.379) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-3.174 
(-0.572) 
 
0.353*** 
(4.906) 
 
… 
  
 
0.013 
(.370) 
 
0.204 
(1.44) 
 
0.004 
(0.422) 
 
0.043*** 
(2.294) 
 
-0.006*** 
(-3.419) 
 
0.243*** 
(1.749) 
 
0.173 
(1.012) 
 
Yes 
 
-1.294 
(-0.426) 
 
-5.820  
(-1.034) 
 
0.398*** 
(4.776) 
 
… 
  
 
0.011 
(0.323) 
 
0.184  
(1.316) 
 
0.004 
(0.376) 
 
0.0421**  
(2.237) 
 
-0.006*** 
(-3.460) 
 
0.252**  
(1.781) 
 
0.170  
(0.995) 
 
Yes 
 
-1.049  
(-0.346) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Observations 119 119 119 119 119 119 
R-squared 0.081 0.151 0.078 0.078 0.114 0.114 
Log-likelihood -3532.483 
 
 
 
-3531.677 -3544.887 -3544.898 -3543.343 -3544.407 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses; asterisks indicate significance as follows: ***=1%, **=5%, *=10%. Variable 
description, descriptive statistics, and sources can be found in Appendix 1. 
 
 
 
 
 30 
 
Table 1.2. Contagion- Currency Crisis 
Geography 
 
Trade 
Trade Dependent  Variable Dependent  Variable 
Currency Crisis 
(%  excess EMP) 
Currency Crisis 
(%  excess EMP) 
 
 
 
Independent  
Variable 
 
 
 
Va  
SAR SEM 
SAR SEM 
  
Export growth 
and bilateral 
trade weight 
 
 
Exports  and 
bilateral trade 
weight 
 
Export growth 
and bilateral 
trade weight 
 
Exports  
and 
bilateral 
trade 
weight 
 Constant 
 
Lambda 
 
 
Rho 
              
 
Lagged 
Crises 
Current Account 
per  GDP  
(annual %) 
Domestic Credit 
per GDP growth 
(annual %) 
M2 – money and 
quasi money  to 
total reserve ratio 
 
CPI (annual %) 
 
GDP growth  
 (annual %) 
 
Unemployment 
 (annual %) 
 
Regional 
Dummies 
 
Island 
 
 
 
-0.134 
(0.044) 
 
… 
 
 
0.143*** 
(9.402) 
 
… 
 
0.021 
(0.279) 
 
-0.0003 
 (-0.055) 
 
0.021** 
(2.065) 
 
-0.0001 
(-0.063) 
 
0.0208 
(0.271) 
 
0.175* 
(1.839) 
 
Yes 
 
-1.248  
(-0.730) 
 
 
-0.138  
(-0.045) 
 
0.151*** 
(9.682) 
 
 
… 
 
… 
  
0.021 
(0.262) 
 
-0.0004 
 (-0.089) 
 
0.021** 
(2.073) 
 
-0.0001 
(-0.072) 
 
0.019 
(0.249) 
 
0.175* 
(1.821) 
 
Yes 
 
-1.621  
(-0.930) 
 
 
-0.139  
(-0.045) 
 
… 
 
 
0.146*** 
(4.26) 
 
... 
 
0.028 
(0.361) 
 
-0.0004  
(-0.077) 
 
0.022*** 
(2.039) 
 
-0.0001 
(-0.079) 
 
0.005  
(0.042) 
 
0.175* 
(1.825) 
 
Yes 
 
-1.432  
(-0.830) 
 
 
-0.267  
(-0.086) 
 
… 
 
 
0.166*** 
(2.471) 
 
… 
 
0.024  
(0.314) 
 
-0.001 
(-0.090) 
 
0.022**  
(2.066) 
 
-0.0001 
(-0.084) 
 
0.003  
(0.041) 
 
0.175*  
(1.827) 
 
Yes 
 
-1.158  
(-0.379) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.321  
(0.103) 
 
0.141***  
(4.035) 
 
 
… 
  
… 
 
0.027  
(0.354) 
 
-0.0004  
(-0.082) 
 
 0.022*** 
(2.044) 
 
-0.0001 
(-0.099) 
 
0.003  
(0.042) 
 
0.175* 
(1.818) 
 
Yes 
 
-1.294 
(-.426) 
 
 
0.310  
(0.100) 
 
0.167*** 
(2.452) 
 
 
… 
  
… 
 
0.026  
(0.340) 
 
0.001 
(-0.087) 
 
  0.022**  
(2.049) 
 
-0.0001 
(-0.083) 
 
0.006  
(0.074) 
 
0.176*  
(1.837) 
 
Yes 
 
-1.443  
(-0.838) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Observations 119 119 119 119 119 119 
R-squared 0.024 0.053 0.026 0.078 0.031 0.114 
Log-likelihood -3061.872 
 
 
-3061.244   -3067.801 -3544.898 -3068.015   -3544.407 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses; asterisks indicate significance as follows: ***=1%, **=5%, *=10%. Variable 
description, descriptive statistics, and sources can be found in Appendix 1. 
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Table 1.3. Contagion- Currency Stability 
Geography 
 
Trade 
Trade Dependent  Variable Dependent  Variable 
Currency Stability 
(%  shortfall EMP) 
Currency Stability 
(%  shortfall EMP) 
 
 
 
Independent  
Variable 
 
 
 
Va  
SAR SEM 
SAR SEM 
Export growth 
and bilateral 
trade weight 
 
Exports  and 
bilateral trade 
weight 
 
Export growth 
and bilateral 
trade weight 
 
Exports  
and 
bilateral 
trade 
weight 
 
 
Constant 
 
 
Lambda 
 
 
Rho 
              
Lagged 
Crises 
 
Current Account 
per  GDP  
(annual %) 
Domestic Credit 
per GDP growth 
(annual %) 
M2 – money and 
quasi money  to 
total reserve ratio 
 
CPI (annual %) 
 
GDP growth  
 (annual %) 
 
Unemployment 
 (annual %) 
 
Regional Dummies 
 
 
Island 
 
 
 
83.552 
(5.317) 
 
… 
 
 
0.176*** 
(5.113) 
 
.. 
 
-0.429  
(-1.105) 
 
-0.0169 
 (-0.597) 
 
0.042 
(0.799) 
 
0.019***  
(4.064) 
 
0.103 
(0.266) 
 
1.467*** 
(3.074) 
 
Yes 
 
9.520  
(1.066) 
 
 
 
97.033***  
(6.233) 
 
0.165*** 
(4.681) 
 
… 
 
 
.. 
 
-0.458  
(-1.149) 
 
-0.017 
 (-0.616) 
 
0.028 
(0.537) 
 
0.019***  
(4.011) 
 
0.085 
(0.215) 
 
1.446*** 
(2.964) 
 
Yes 
 
-1.874  
(-0.212) 
 
 
58.280***  
(3.558) 
 
… 
 
 
0.455*** 
(6.620) 
 
... 
 
-0.436  
(-1.136) 
 
-0.019  
(-0.711) 
 
0.0344  
(0.660) 
 
0.019***  
(4.035) 
 
0.333  
(0.868) 
 
1.546*** 
(3.281) 
 
Yes 
 
-3.799  
(-0.446) 
 
 
 
48.339*** 
(8.784) 
 
… 
 
 
0.522*** 
(3.592) 
 
… 
 
-0.760***  
(-2.039) 
 
-0.020  
(-0.729) 
 
0.052  
(1.010) 
 
0.018***  
(3.961) 
 
0.274  
(0.728) 
 
1.367***  
(2.940) 
 
Yes 
 
-2.209  
(-0.262) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
98.666*** 
(6.167) 
 
0.454***  
(6.180) 
 
… 
 
  
… 
 
-0.702* 
(-1.775) 
 
-0.020  
(-0.715) 
 
 0.043 
(0.822) 
 
0.018***  
(3.932) 
 
0.466  
(1.197) 
 
1.401* ** 
(2.931) 
 
Yes 
 
-1.009  
(-0.118) 
 
 
93.410  
(5.877) 
 
0.489*** 
(6.821) 
 
… 
 
  
… 
 
-0.745***  
(-1.904) 
 
-0.018  
(-0.667) 
 
  0.051 
(0.987) 
 
0.018*** 
(3.969) 
 
0.356  
(0.901) 
 
1.340***  
(2.814) 
 
Yes 
 
-0.724  
(-0.086) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Observations 119 119 119 119 119 119 
R-squared 0.139 0.162 0.132 0.141 0.185 0.191 
Log-likelihood -4410.159 
 
-4412.832 -4401.9933 -4396.5019 -4403.8768   -4401.0794   
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses; asterisks indicate significance as follows: ***=1%, **=5%, *=10%. Variable 
description, descriptive statistics, and sources can be found in Appendix 1. 
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Table 1.4. Contagion- Currency Crisis (robust) 
Geography 
 
Trade 
Trade Dependent  Variable Dependent  Variable 
Currency Crisis 
( excess EMP) 
Currency Crisis 
(excess EMP) 
 
 
 
Independent  
Variable 
 
 
 
Va  
SAR SEM 
SAR SEM 
 
Export growth 
and bilateral 
trade weight 
 
 
Exports  and 
bilateral trade 
weight 
 
 
Export growth 
and bilateral 
trade weight 
 
Exports  
and 
bilateral 
trade 
weight 
 
 
Constant 
 
 
Lambda 
 
 
Rho 
              
 
Lagged 
Crises 
Current Account 
per  GDP  
(annual %) 
Domestic Credit 
per GDP growth  
(annual %) 
M2 – money and 
quasi money  to 
total reserve ratio 
 
CPI (annual %) 
 
GDP growth  
 (annual %) 
 
Unemployment 
 (annual %) 
 
Regional Dummies 
 
 
Island 
 
 
-0.012  
(-0.012) 
 
… 
 
 
0.174*** 
(4.934) 
 
… 
 
0.010 
(0.387) 
 
-0.0001 
 (-0.048) 
 
0.009*** 
(2.541) 
 
-0.00003 
(-0.098) 
 
0.001 
(0.038) 
 
0.058* 
(1.842) 
 
Yes 
 
-0.501  
(-0.873) 
 
 
-0.002  
(-0.001) 
 
0.189*** 
(10.571) 
 
… 
 
 
… 
 
0.010 
(0.380) 
 
-0.0001 
 (-0.087) 
 
0.009*** 
(2.554) 
 
-0.00003 
(-0.101) 
 
0.001 
(0.249) 
 
0.059* 
(1.823) 
 
Yes 
 
-0.661  
(-1.127) 
 
 
-0.008  
(-0.008) 
 
… 
 
 
0.147*** 
(4.064) 
 
... 
 
0.012  
(0.467) 
 
-0.0001 
 (-0.069) 
 
0.009*** 
(2.502) 
 
-0.0001 
(-0.079) 
 
-0.005  
(-0.174) 
 
0.058* 
(1.794) 
 
Yes 
 
-0.604  
(-1.038) 
 
 
-0.030  
(-0.029) 
 
… 
 
 
0.174*** 
(2.611) 
 
… 
 
0.011  
(0.467) 
 
-0.0002 
(-0.084) 
 
0.009**  
(2.526) 
 
-0.00004 
(-0.134) 
 
-0.006  
(-0.218) 
 
0.058*  
(1.805) 
 
Yes 
 
-0.600  
(-1.033) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.147  
(0.141) 
 
0.144***  
(4.075) 
 
… 
 
  
… 
 
-0.0001  
(-0.075) 
 
-0.0001  
(-0.075) 
 
0.009*** 
(2.503) 
 
-0.00005 
(-0.147) 
 
-0.006  
(-0.211) 
 
0.057* 
(1.784) 
 
Yes 
 
-0.587  
(-1.009) 
 
 
0.170  
(0.163) 
 
0.170*** 
(2.532) 
 
… 
 
  
… 
 
0.012  
(0.436) 
 
-0.0001  
(-0.079) 
 
  0.009*** 
(2.504) 
 
-0.0004 
(-0.133) 
 
-0.005  
(-0.172) 
 
0.059*  
(1.812) 
 
Yes 
 
-0.593  
(-1.024) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Observations 119 119 119 119 119 119 
R-squared 0.024 0.066 0.026 0.025 0.031 0.035 
Log-likelihood -2152.590 -2151.780 -3067.801 -2160.222 -3068.015   -2160.315 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses; asterisks indicate significance as follows: ***=1%, **=5%, *=10%. Variable 
description, descriptive statistics, and sources can be found in Appendix 1. 
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Table 1.5. Contagion- Currency Stability(robust) 
Geography 
 
Trade 
Trade Dependent  Variable Dependent  Variable 
Currency Stability 
(EMP shortfall) 
Currency Stability 
(EMP shortfall) 
 
 
 
Independent  
Variable 
 
 
 
Va  
SAR SEM 
SAR SEM 
 
Export growth 
and bilateral 
trade weight 
 
 
Exports  and 
bilateral trade 
weight 
 
Export growth 
and bilateral 
trade weight 
 
Exports  
and 
bilateral 
trade 
weight 
 
 
Constant 
 
 
Lambda 
 
 
Rho 
              
 
Lagged Crises 
 
Current Account 
per  GDP 
(annual %) 
Domestic Credit 
per GDP growth 
(annual %) 
M2 – money and 
quasi money  to 
total reserve ratio 
 
CPI (annual %) 
 
GDP growth  
 (annual %) 
 
Unemployment 
 (annual %) 
 
Regional Dummies 
 
 
Island 
 
 
9.869* 
(1.806) 
 
… 
 
 
0.171*** 
(4.935) 
 
.. 
 
-0.184  
(1.348) 
 
0.004 
 (0.419) 
 
0.035* 
(1.905) 
 
0.019***  
(4.011) 
 
0.129 
(0.948) 
 
0.147 
(0.881) 
 
Yes 
 
0.777 
(0.246) 
 
 
14.123**  
(2.614) 
 
0.165*** 
(4.647) 
 
… 
 
 
.. 
 
-0.196  
(-1.405) 
 
0.004 
 (0.401) 
 
0.032 
(.736) 
 
0.003*  
(1.724) 
 
0.112 
(0.805) 
 
0.099 
(0.581) 
 
Yes 
 
-2.852  
(-0.920) 
 
 
4.244 
(0.860) 
 
… 
 
 
0.384*** 
(4.894) 
 
... 
 
-0.175  
(-1.29) 
 
0.003 
(0.298) 
 
0.0301* 
(1.666) 
 
0.003 
(1.57) 
 
0.105  
(0.786) 
 
0.105 
(0.636) 
 
Yes 
 
-3.799  
(-0.446) 
 
 
0.396  
(0.069) 
 
… 
 
 
0.508*** 
(6.881) 
 
… 
 
-0.278**  
(-2.069) 
 
0.003  
(0.324) 
 
0.037**  
(2.056) 
 
0.003*  
(1.780) 
 
0.105  
(0.786) 
 
0.105  
(0.636) 
 
Yes 
 
-3.679  
(-1.238) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14.820*** 
(2.703) 
 
0.382*** 
(5.167) 
 
… 
 
 
…  
 
-0.254* 
(-1.829) 
 
0.003 
(0.282) 
 
 0.033* 
(1.788) 
 
0.003* 
(1.635) 
 
0.228*  
(1.677) 
 
0.119  
(0.712) 
 
Yes 
 
-3.716  
(-1.240) 
 
 
13.619***  
(2.443) 
 
0.507*** 
(6.738) 
 
… 
 
  
… 
 
-0.310**  
(-2.258) 
 
0.004 
(0.360) 
 
  0.036** 
(1.982) 
 
0.003* 
(1.871) 
 
0.135  
(0.968) 
 
0.064  
(0.381) 
 
Yes 
 
-3.717  
(-1.260) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Observations 119 119 119 119 119 119 
R-squared 0.100 0.126 0.077 0.095 0.138 0.153 
Log-likelihood -3536.582  -3538.811 -3532.869 -3526.800 --3533.406 -3528.421   
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses; asterisks indicate significance as follows: ***=1%, **=5%, *=10%. Variable 
description, descriptive statistics, and sources can be found in Appendix 1. 
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 Table 1.6. Contagion - Using Dummy Dependent Variables 
Geography 
 
 
 
Trade 
Trade 
Trade 
Dependent  Variable Dependent  Variable 
Currency 
Crisis 
 
Currency 
Stability 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Dummies) 
Currency 
Crisis 
 
 
 
 
Currency 
Stability 
 
 
 
 
 
Independent  
Variable 
 
 
 
Va  
SAR SAR 
 
 
SAR- Exports and 
bilateral trade weight 
 
 
SAR- Exports  
and bilateral trade 
weight 
  
Constant 
 
 
Lambda 
 
Rho 
              
 
LaggedCrises 
Current Account 
per  GDP  
(annual %) 
Domestic Credit 
per GDP growth  
(annual %) 
 
M2 – money and 
quasi money  to 
total reserve ratio 
 
CPI (annual %) 
 
GDP growth  
 (annual %) 
 
Unemployment 
 (annual %) 
 
Regional 
Dummies 
 
Island 
 
 
0.159** 
(2.051) 
 
… 
 
0.066*** 
(6.540) 
 
… 
 
0.003*  
(1.679) 
 
0.00002 
 (0.199) 
 
-0.00006  
(-0.229) 
 
-0.00002  
(-0.844) 
 
-0.008*** 
 (-4.304) 
 
-0.010*** 
(-4.225) 
 
Yes 
 
-0.017  
(-0.402) 
 
 
0.711*** 
(8.500) 
 
… 
 
0.126*** 
(3.852) 
 
… 
 
0.003*  
(-1.556) 
 
-0.00003 
 (-0.199) 
 
0.0002 
(0.881) 
 
0.00003  
(1.271) 
 
0.012*** 
 (6.169) 
 
0.011*** 
(4.615) 
 
Yes 
 
0.133 *** 
(2.761) 
 
 
0.160**  
(2.055) 
 
… 
 
0.053*** 
(3.404) 
 
… 
 
0.003*  
(1.722) 
 
0.00003 
(0.201) 
 
-0.00006  
(-0.233) 
 
-0.00002 
(-0.867) 
 
-0.009*** 
(-4.424) 
 
-0.010***  
(-4.275) 
 
Yes 
 
-0.026  
(-0.601) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.537***  
(5.167) 
 
… 
 
0.308***  
(4.107) 
 
… 
 
-0.004* 
(-1.879) 
 
-0.00003 
(-0.176) 
 
 0.0002 
(0.728) 
 
0.00003  
(1.315) 
 
0.012***  
(6.420) 
 
0.011***  
(4.615)  
 
Yes 
 
0.049  
(1.153) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Observations 119 119 119 119 
R-squared 0.090   0.126 0.089 0.131 
Log-likelihood -0.45343073  6.4585471 -1.643789 7.4175162 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses; asterisks indicate significance as follows: ***=1%, **=5%, *=10%. Variable 
description, descriptive statistics, and sources can be found in Appendix 1. 
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Chapter  3 
 
The Spread of Financial Development 
3.1. Introduction 
The increased focus on financial development (a measure of the credit advanced to the private 
sector in a country) in both the development and finance literature comes mainly from its 
believed role in promoting economic growth during the recent trend towards globalization. For 
example, high risks of expropriation and thus insecure property rights limit financial 
development and the ability of a country to take advantage of financial globalization.  Moreover, 
financial development is one of the prerequisites for a country to realize the full growth potential 
of FDI. Domestic banking development is one of the important requirements in exploiting 
growth opportunities. (Stulz, 2005; Hermes and Lensink, 1999; Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad and 
Siegel, 2007). 
            There is a positive relationship between private sector enforcement, financial 
development and investment and growth. It is also documented that the effect of liberalization on 
economic growth is greater if a country starts from above average level of financial 
development. Researchers have empirically shown evidence supporting the Schumpeterian 
theory of convergence that countries with a certain critical level of financial development have a 
likelihood of converging to the world–technology frontier and that other countries have far lower 
long-run growth. (Johnson, McMillan and Woodruff, 2002; Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad, 
2005; Aghion, Howitt, and Mayer-Fulkes, 2003). 
            The foregoing literature has many implications, including but not limited to the 
following: as countries make every possible effort to converge to the world‟s technological 
frontier, for the convergence theory to hold, countries need to attain a certain threshold of 
 36 
 
financial development; governments of countries may need to booster domestic investment by 
encouraging both actual and potential entrepreneurs to secure the necessary funds needed for 
such ventures; globalization can lead to competition between domestic and foreign lenders for 
customers (potential and actual entrepreneurs and investors). The first two points listed above 
begs the question how do countries attain the necessary level of financial development? While a 
few papers such as Koubi (2008) have addressed issues like the determinants of financial 
development, no paper has examined whether financial development is contagious. 
            This chapter tests whether the amount of private credit being advanced to the private 
sector in one country depends on what is prevailing in the private credit markets of other 
countries. Second, it attempts to find out what the transmission mechanisms are and what the 
magnitude of the contagion is in each case. This chapter therefore examines how countries attain 
the necessary level of financial development needed for growth convergence. It identifies three 
channels of contagion in financial development namely financial linkages, trade and geography. 
            My results suggest that each of these is a significant channel through which financial 
development can spread from one country to the other. Specifically, it finds which channel is 
more effective and more responsible for the spread and growth of financial development in 
countries. Whiles no single channel seem to be the sole means of transmission, my results show 
that Financial linkages are a more effective means followed closely by trade and geography. In 
section 2, I shortly explain each of these channels; section 3 expatiates on the methodology and 
data followed by presentation of my results and conclusion in sections 4 and 5 respectively 
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3.2. Transmission Mechanisms of Financial Development 
3.2.1. Geography as a channel of Financial Development 
The geographic spread of financial development is fostered by economic unions and the 
activities of a common lender to a regional block.  
            One way financial development can spread by geography is through economic unions. 
Through economic unions like NAFTA or the EU, financial development can spread to member 
countries which join such unions. Cvetanovic (2006) shows how the EU can, for example, 
contribute to the financial development of the eight former-Socialist European accession (EU-8) 
countries that joined it. The paper argues that through the activities of institutional investors 
(domestic and foreign) such as insurance companies, mutual funds and private pension funds 
there will be liquidity boost in terms of share of turnover in the market and a reduction in the 
cost of capital, which would make it easier for liquidity-constrained firms in the union to obtain 
fresh capital infusion. 
            Finally, a regional block having a common lender can experience similar financial 
development, especially changes of financial development in their geographical location. 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) explain that when a common creditor country has nonperforming 
loans in one of its customer countries in a regional block it may chose to reduce or withdraw its 
credit advances to the country involved as well as customer countries in the entire block. This 
was what happened during the Asian crisis when Japan happened to be a common lender to most 
of the Asian countries. 
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3.2.2. Trade as a channel of Financial Development 
Trade is another major way financial development can spread. Rajan and Zingales (2003a, 
2003b) show that financial development is associated with trade liberalization. They document 
that “periods when and countries where borders were open to foreign trade and capital coincided 
with periods of intense financial development. This is true even controlling for endogeneity of 
the decision to open up borders”. According to their findings, even though special interest groups 
could have strong motives to hinder the development of a good financial sector, openness to 
international trade and capital flows could mitigate these incentives. 
             Second, trade openness leads to increased competition from foreigners. To be able to 
compete with foreign countries, especially more developed countries, poorer countries need to 
attain a certain critical level of financial development and would enforce financial development. 
Firms and entrepreneurs would put pressure on their governments to make legislations that 
would make financial development thrive to enable them compete in the global marketplace. 
 
3.2.3. Financial linkages as a channel of Financial Development 
Financial linkages between countries can also have spillover effects on countries‟ level of 
financial development. In other words, a country that has financial linkages with other countries 
with different levels of financial development will have its financial sector affected differently 
by each of those countries.  
            For example, the spillover effects of FDI have been explored by many researchers. 
Lipsey (2000) shows that there has been an increased capital formation in Canada as a result of 
FDI inflows. Also, Dutta and Roy (forthcoming) find that FDI has positive spillover effects on 
 1
While there apparently are causality issues between FDI and financial development especially at low levels of 
financial development (Rioja and Valev 2004), this paper just uses FDI to construct a weight matrix to proxy for 
financial linkages and does not use FDI itself as an explanatory variable. 
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a country‟s institutional framework. They document that not only will FDI bring technology 
spillovers into a country but that it also ensures better corporate governance, efficient laws, better 
legal environments and financial comfort (FDI
1
 is thus used to weigh financial linkages in this 
study). Financial development, being also a formal institution, is therefore liable to receiving this 
positive spillover either directly or indirectly. 
            Financial linkages can either be direct or indirect. Directly, financial linkages can be in 
the form of private credit unions or financial institutions established by foreign firms (primarily 
for their employees), which can eventually help in establishing financial development in the 
domestic countries. Indirectly, it could also go beyond this point to have a ripple effect through 
competition, learning, and motivation. First, domestic private lenders would compete with 
foreign credit unions or financial institutions that have better credit risk and monitoring 
expertise. In order not to lose customers (borrowers) to these firms they would seek a better 
system that will enable them to efficiently advance credit.  
            Second, domestic lenders also have the opportunity to learn the expertise (such as the 
ability to distinguish good credit risks from bad credit risks) from these foreign lenders and 
hence be in a better position to advance more credit to the private sector.  
 
3.3. Data and Methodology 
3.3.1. Dependent Variables 
For the purpose of this chapter, I consider three measures of financial development namely 
domestic credit to the private sector as a percentage of GDP, private credit by the banking sector 
as a percentage of GDP, and stock market total value traded as a percentage of GDP. 
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The first two measure domestic banking development and banking development respectively. 
Domestic credit to the private sector includes credit from all domestic sources (private and 
public) to the private sector. Private credit banking sector includes credit from all commercial 
banks from home and abroad. The last one relates to stock market liquidity and measures stock 
market development. Domestic credit to the private sector as a percentage of GDP is used for the 
main analysis while the rest two measure domestic banking development and banking 
development respectively while the last one relates to stock market liquidity and measures stock 
market development. Domestic credit to the private sector as a percentage of GDP is used for the 
main analysis while the rest are for robustness checks.  
            In addition to a specification estimating the level of financial development level, I will 
also consider a specification using change of financial development. This change specification 
examines whether credit freezes or other shocks are also contagious. Data is from 1985-2000. 
The data for financial development comes from World Development Indicator (WDI). Data 
descriptions and statistics are found in appendix 3. 
 
3.3.2. Independent Variables 
The independent variables used in this study include initial GDP per-capita, the lagged level of 
financial development, spatial weight matrixes and regional or continent dummies. Lagged levels 
of countries‟ financial development are included to examine if there is any evidence of 
institutional dependence; that is if previous levels of financial development affect the present. 
Data for these variables is also taken from the World Development Indicator Series Data (WDI). 
            Other variables are the indexes of bureaucratic quality, the risk of expropriation of private 
investment, the risk of repudiation of contracts by governments and legal environment, which is 
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the summation of the last two indicators. Higher values of the bureaucratic quality index indicate 
that bureaucratic delays are low or the bureaucratic structure of the country is high. High values 
of the risk of expropriation index, the risk of repudiation of contracts and hence the legal 
environment means that it is safer to transact business in such a country. In other words, 
governments are not likely to confiscate private investment or inadvertently alter contracts or 
arbitrarily change business agreements with foreign investors.  Data for these measures are taken 
from the ICRG dataset. 
             For the measures of geography I collect data on nearest neighbors from the World Fact 
Book. The trade data is taken from the IFS Direction of Trade databases. FDI data comes from 
the OECD data base on the bilateral FDI inflows from countries. The FDI data comprises of only 
data on the OECD countries due to unavailability of data; only the OECD countries provide data 
on FDI inflows from other countries and hence the weight matrix can only be constructed for 
these countries. The full sample however comprises of a panel of 98 countries for the geography 
regression and the trade regression and a panel of 30 countries for the FDI regression. Five years 
averages are computed and used for panel regressions. 
 
3.3.3. Methodology 
This study uses spatial econometric methods to examine the spread of financial development. I 
will use both a spatial autoregressive model (SAR) and spatial error model (SEM). SAR 
specifies a country‟s financial development as a function of the weighted value of the financial 
development of its geographic neighbors, trade partners, and FDI partner. SEM models the error 
term of a country‟s financial development as a function of the weighted value of its geographic 
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neighbors‟ errors, trade partners‟ errors, and FDI partner‟s errors. The regression uses five year 
averages for a panel regression. 
                These models are specified below: 
These models are specified below: 
:SAR  
 tttt XWYY                                                                       (1) 
:SEM  
                 ttt
XY   ;   ttt W                                                        (2) 
where W  is an NXN weight matrix with respect trade or geography; tX  is a vector of controls 
variables, tY  is an NX1 vector of measures of the dependent variables;  and   are the spatial 
autoregressive and spatial error coefficients respectively (which represent the percentage of  a 
country‟s dependent variable accounted for by the dependent variable of  its trade linkages or 
geographic neighbors), and t  and t  are  NX1 matrixes of iid random errors. 
            To use this approach, I will first test for the presence of spatial dependence using the 
Lagrangian Multiplier (LM) test which shows whether OLS estimates would be biased and also 
helps chose the best spatial model (the one with the largest LM t-statistic).  I use both models in 
my analysis; based on my test, SEM is the best model for the analysis. While I ran both 
regressions only the SEM results are reported. 
 
3.3.4. Weight Matrixes 
I construct a spatial weight matrix for geographic neighbors, FDI and trade partners as in Leeson 
and Sobel (2006). For financial linkages the weight country A assigns to each country is 
calculated as the ratio of each country‟s FDI partner‟s inflows to the country‟s total FDI inflows.  
 43 
 
The same applies to the trade weight matrix, where the weight is calculated as a percentage of 
the imports of partner countries to country A‟s total imports. In matrix notation this is 
represented below: 
 

























nj
nn
nj
nj
j
j
j
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
W
...
...
...
...
...
1
1
1
11
1
                for j =1, 2, ….n.                        (3)                                     
 
where  jiX ,  represents imports or FDI inflows from country j  to country i  .  
            For the geography weight matrix, I use the “queen” case of first order contiguity. Thus a 
country gives a weight of one to every country it shares a border with (whether vertically, 
horizontally or at vertex contacts) and zero otherwise. As with the other weight matrices above, 
the geography weight matrix is row standardized. In other words the weight given by each 
country to geographic neighbors is calculated as a ratio of 1 to the total number of the countries 
that each country shares neighbors with.  For example, if country A has 4 neighbors, then each of 
these countries is assigned a weight of ¼ by country A.   

























nj
jn
nj
jn
j
j
j
j
W








...
...
...
...
...
1
1
1
1
2
                j =1, 2, ….n.                        (4)  
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neighborsarejandi
otherwise
countryif
ji




0
1
                              (5)                                                       
 
This makes the weights given by each country to all others sum up to 1. This is represented in 
matrix notations above. 
            The problem with geography though is that countries which are islands may not be 
assigned any weights. To deal with this problem, I assigned a dummy which takes a value one if 
a country is an island and zero otherwise. If the island dummy is insignificant it will be dropped, 
otherwise this will necessitate running the regression without islands. 
In the following sections, I will present my results, analyze it, recommend policies and conclude. 
 
3.4. Results 
 Table 2.1 shows the result for geography while Table 2.2 and Table 2.3 show results for trade 
and Financial linkages respectively. Column 4 of all tables show the results for financial 
development (measured as domestic credit to the private sector as a percentage of  
GDP) when all control variables are used, including the lagged level of financial development. 
The Financial linkgages results do not include lagged levels due to insufficient data. Column 8 of 
Table 2.1 and Table 2.2 and column 3 of Table 2.3 show the results for change of financial 
development. 
            The result shows that there is contagion both in levels and first differences in financial 
development. That is, countries linked to others (by geography, trade or financial linkages) with 
high levels of financial development tend to “catch” high levels of financial development. This is 
also true when countries are linked to others experiencing changes of financial development 
(such as credit freezes or other shocks). Also, this study finds that financial linkages are the 
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dominant channel of contagion followed by trade and geography. The SEM regression results are 
the ones reported for analysis based on the LM tests. 
             The value of lambda shows contagion in financial development. At levels this is 0.184, 
0.19 and 0.272 for geography, trade and financial linkages respectively. In other words, countries 
catch 0.184, 0.19 and 0.272 of their neighbors‟ levels of financial development, their trade 
partners‟ levels of financial development and their financial linkage countries‟ levels of financial 
development respectively. Since the Financial linkages regression does not have a lagged term as 
the other regressions, for robustness checks, I run the regression using other dependent variables. 
Column 2 of Table 2.3 shows that the contagion at levels of financial development (measured as 
stock market total value traded as a percentage of GDP) is 0.44. All results are significant at the 
1 percent level.     
           Contagion in changes of financial development is 0.185, and 0.187 for geography and 
trade respectively. Since the financial linkages regression does not have a lagged term as the 
other regressions, I have no results for the contagion in the changes of financial development 
measured as domestic credit to the private sector through financial linkages. However, Table 2.3 
shows that contagion through financial linkages, using change of private credit by the banking 
sector (banking development) as the dependent variable, is 0.289. These results are significant at 
the 5 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels for geography, trade and financial linkages 
respectively.  
            The chapter also finds lagged levels of financial development to account significantly and 
positively for the level of financial development, but negatively for the changes of financial 
development. The coefficient on lagged FD shows that lagged levels of financial development 
accounts for 89 percent of the level of financial development in a country. 
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The results are all significant at 1 percent level. This means that there is evidence of institutional 
dependence at levels of financial development. Thus countries with previous high levels of 
financial development would tend to have higher levels of financial development than countries 
with lower levels of financial development. 
         However, changes in financial development tend to inversely correlate with lagged levels 
of financial development, implying convergence. The results show that lagged levels of financial 
development inversely accounts for 11 percent of the change of financial development in a 
country. These are all significant at the 1 percent levels.  
            The chapter also finds bureaucratic quality important for financial development. This is 
especially true in the trade and geography regressions where bureaucratic quality accounts for 
about 3.6 percent and 2.7 percent respectively. These can be found in Table 2.1 and Table 2.2. 
Legal environment is found to matter only for change of financial development, measured as 
domestic banking development. This is found Table 3 in the financial linkages regression. The 
results indicate that legal environment is negatively related to changes of private credit by the 
banking sector and this accounts for about 10.5 percent. In other words the lower the level of 
legal uncertainty in a country, the higher the change of financial development. This finding 
supports Koubi (2008). Separately, the risk of expropriation and the risk of repudiation of 
contracts do not seem to matter in all regressions.  
           Finally, in all regressions, the chapter finds per capita GDP as only statistically significant 
but not economically significant for financial development.  The coefficient on per capita GDP 
in all tables indicates that per capita GDP is only statistically significant at 1 per 
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3.5. Conclusion 
This chapter examines whether financial development is contagious and finds evidence of 
contagion through geography, trade and financial linkages. While none of these channels seem to 
be solely responsible for the spread of financial development, the chapter finds financial linkages 
as the dominant channel both at levels and at first difference followed by trade and geography, 
which seem to have similar magnitudes of contagion.  The result for contagion for change of 
financial development and levels of financial development are very close, suggesting that 
changes of financial development, such as credit freezes, are almost as contagious as levels of 
financial development. 
            The chapter also finds evidence of institutional dependence at levels of financial 
development. This implies that countries with high previous levels of financial development tend 
to have higher levels of financial development than countries with lower previous levels of 
financial development. The findings of this chapter also suggest a positive relationship between 
financial development and bureaucratic quality and a negative relationship between financial 
development and the legal environment. 
            Based on the findings of this chapter, a suggestion to developing countries as well as 
multilateral corporations would be to establish more financial linkages and trade links between 
developing countries and the developed world especially in the area of stock market 
development. This would be more effective in an environment of bureaucratic efficiency and low 
legal uncertainty. 
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Table 2.1: Geographic Contagion 
 
 
 
 
Independent  
Variable 
 
Dependent Variable 
 
Level of Financial Development 
 
Change in the Level of  Financial Development 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
 
8 
 
Lambda 
 
 
Constant 
 
 
Island 
 
Per Capita 
Income 
 
Lagged 
 FD level 
 
 Bureaucratic 
Quality                  
 
Risk of 
Expropriation  
 
Risk of 
repudiation of  
contracts 
Legal  
Environment                 
(sum of the 
risk of 
expropriation 
and risk of 
repudiation of 
contracts). 
                
                  
Regional  
Dummies 
 
0.088 
(1.377) 
 
0.475*** 
(4.083) 
 
0.090* 
(1.680) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
YES 
 
0.107* 
(1.664) 
 
0.127* 
(1.795) 
 
0.035 
(1.1400) 
 
0.00001** 
(2.270) 
 
0.868*** 
(17.624) 
 
0.026*** 
(2.901) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
YES 
 
0.102  
(1.584) 
 
0.127* 
(1.790) 
 
0.034 
 (1.112) 
 
0.00001*** 
(2.263) 
 
0.867*** 
(17.613) 
 
0.027** 
(2.083) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.00003 
(-0.109) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
YES 
 
0.184** 
(2.948) 
 
-0.0342 
(-1.235) 
 
0.075* 
(2.684) 
 
0.00001*** 
(2.496) 
 
0.891*** 
(18.677) 
 
0.027*** 
(3.065) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.003 
(-0.095) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NO 
 
0.265*** 
(4.452) 
 
0.0847 
(1.217) 
 
0.044 
(1.341) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
YES 
 
0.189*** 
(3.035) 
 
0.004 
(0.114) 
 
… 
 
 
0.00001*** 
(2.844) 
 
-0.130*** 
(-2.687) 
 
0.029** 
(2.286) 
 
-0.02 
(-1.610) 
 
0.018 
(1.371) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NO 
 
0.104  
(1.616) 
 
0.128* 
(1.793) 
 
0.035 
 (1.118) 
 
0.00001** 
(2.2593) 
 
-0.132*** 
(-2.682) 
 
0.027** 
(2.082) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.0004 
(-0.121) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
YES 
 
0.185*** 
(2.965) 
 
-0.033 
(-0.987) 
 
0.075*** 
(2.646) 
 
0.00001*** 
(2.489) 
 
-0.108*** 
(-2.270) 
 
0.0278*** 
(2.197) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.00003 
(-0.090) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NO 
  
R-Squared 
 
0.3448    
 
0.8001    
 
0.800 
 
0.241 
 
0.1603    
 
0.196    
 
0.242 
 
0.207 
 
Log-
likelihood 
 
28.562 
 
202.904 
 
202.908 
 
204.462 
 
179.506  
 
192.743 
 
202.914 
 
195.027 
Number of  
Observations 
 
294 
 
294 
 
294 
 
294 
 
294 
 
294 
 
294 
 
294 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses; asterisks indicate significance as follows: ***=1%, **=5%, *=10%. Variable description, 
descriptive statistics, and sources can be found in Appendix 3. 
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Table 2.2: Trade Contagion 
 
 
 
 
Independent  
Variable 
 
Dependent Variable 
 
Level of Financial Development 
 
Change in the Level of  Financial Development 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
 
8 
 
Lambda 
 
 
Constant 
 
 
Island 
           
 
Per Capita 
Income 
 
Lagged 
FD level 
 
Bureaucratic 
Quality                   
 
Risk of 
Expropriation  
Risk of 
repudiation of  
contracts 
 
Legal  
Environment                 
(sum of the 
risk of 
expropriation 
and risk of 
repudiation 
of contracts). 
               
Regional  
Dummies 
 
0.163* 
(1.660) 
 
0.434**
* (3.719) 
 
0.087* 
(1.667) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
YES 
 
0.202** 
(2.104) 
 
0.135* 
(1.889) 
 
0.023 
(0.781) 
 
0.0000004 
(1.619) 
 
0.852*** 
(17.270) 
 
0.033*** 
(2.597) 
 
-0.024** 
(-2.042) 
 
0.021 
(1.639) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
YES 
 
0.171* 
(1.750) 
 
0.129* 
(1.798) 
 
0.029  
(0.925) 
 
0.000004* 
(1.820) 
 
0.866*** 
(17.681) 
 
0.034*** 
(2.597) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.002 
(-0.632) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
YES 
 
0.190** 
(1.965) 
 
-0.027 
(-0.848) 
 
 
 
 
0.00001*** 
(2.713) 
 
0.888*** 
(18.388) 
 
0.036*** 
(2.880) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.0003 
(-0.777) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NO 
 
0.426*** 
(5.303) 
 
0.066 
(0.925) 
 
0.036 
(1.162) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
YES 
 
0.201** 
(5.231) 
 
0.135* 
(1.889) 
 
0.024 
(0.781) 
 
0.000004 
(1.622) 
 
-0.148*** 
(-2.991) 
 
0.033*** 
(2.594) 
 
-0.024** 
(-2.039) 
 
0.021 
(1.638) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
YES 
 
0.174* 
(1.795) 
 
0.127* 
(1.798) 
 
0.028 
 (0.920) 
 
0.000004* 
(1.807) 
 
-0.133*** 
(-2.719) 
 
0.033** 
(2.611) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.002 
(-0.652) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
YES 
 
0.187** 
(1.961) 
 
0.027 
(-0.847) 
 
 
 
 
0.00001*** 
(2.715) 
 
-0.111*** 
(-2.297) 
 
0.036*** 
(2.876) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.0003 
(-0.770) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NO 
 
 R-Squared 
 
0.3515    
 
0.804 
 
0.8014  
 
0.7817 
 
0.1605    
 
0.257 
 
0.247 
 
0.172 
 
Log-likelihood 
 
29.924 
 
205.604 
 
203.857 
 
189.761 
 
179.5548   
 
205.605 
 
203.861 
 
194.149 
Number of  
Observations 
 
294 
 
294 
 
294 
 
294 
 
294 
 
294 
 
294 
 
294 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses; asterisks indicate significance as follows: ***=1%, **=5%, *=10%. Variable description, 
descriptive statistics, and sources can be found in Appendix 3. 
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         Table 2.3: Financial Linkages Contagion 
 
 
 
 
Independent  
Variable 
 
Dependent Variables 
Stock  Market 
Total  Value 
Traded   
(% GDP) 
Stock  Market Total  
Value Traded   
(% GDP) 
 
Change in the level 
of Private Credit  by 
the Banking Sector  
(% GDP) 
Domestic Credit to the 
Private Sector 
 (% GDP)  
 
Lambda 
 
 
Constant 
 
 
Island 
        
 
Per Capita  
Income 
 
Lagged FD level 
 
Bureaucratic Quality                   
 
Risk of Expropriation  
 
Risk of repudiation of  
contracts 
 
Legal  Environment                 
(sum of the risk of 
expropriation and risk 
of repudiation of 
contracts) 
 
Regional Dummies 
 
0.458*** 
(3.971) 
 
-0.064 
(-0.222) 
 
0.395*** 
(2.725) 
 
0.00001***  
(2.972) 
 
 
 
0.053
(1.331) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.033 
(-1.528) 
 
YES 
 
0.440*** 
(3.734) 
 
0.204 
(0.702) 
 
-0.012 
(-0.185) 
 
0.00001***  
(2.643) 
 
 
 
0.052 
(1.257) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.025 
(-1.076) 
 
NO 
 
0.289** 
(2.122) 
 
-1.952*** 
(-3.308) 
 
0.053 
(0.334) 
 
0.00001  
(1.054) 
 
 
 
-0.022 
(-0.284) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.105** 
(2.324) 
 
YES 
 
0.272** 
(1.980) 
 
0.099 
(0.289) 
 
 
 
 
0.00002*** 
(6.506) 
 
 
 
0.023 
(0.476) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.002 
(0.009) 
 
NO 
 
 R-Squared 
 
0.193 
 
0.316 
 
0.193 
 
0.374 
 
Log-likelihood 
 
-30.257 
 
-148.298 
 
-30.257 
 
5.588 
Number of  
Observations 
 
90 
 
90 
 
90 
 
90 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses; asterisks indicate significance as follows: ***=1%, **=5%, *=10%.  
Variable  description, descriptive statistics, and sources can be found in Appendix 3. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Is Ethno-linguistic Fractionalization Perpetuated in Africa? 
 
4.1. Introduction 
Though many factors have been found to account for the underdevelopment of African countries, 
ethno-linguistic fractionalization has been gaining increasing attention in the development 
literature. For example, the relationship between institutions, ethno-linguistic fractionalization 
and growth has been explored by many researchers. This includes the indirect effects of colonial 
institutions on the ability of Africans to trade peacefully. Colonial institutions in Africa are found 
to have exacerbated fractionalization, which led to the poor growth of African countries. 
Alternatively, good institutions mitigate fractionalization and this leads to economic growth. 
Some of other findings are that ethno-linguistic fractionalization negatively impacts economic 
growth and policies in Africa, and this is responsible for poor growth in Africa (Leeson, 2005; 
Easterly, 2001; Easterly and Levine , 1997).  
            The relationship between linguistic diversity, political stability and democracy has also 
been examined. Linguistic diversity has positive impact on political instability. It is also 
discovered that democracy eliminates the negative impact of ethno-linguistic fractionalization on 
growth. There is also a positive relationship between ethnic homogeneity and trust and this 
relationship reinforces the positive relationship between trust and economic growth (Collier, 
1999; Mauro, 1995; Knack and Keefer, 1997).  Cunning and Fay (1993) also explore the 
relationship between long-run growth and ethno-linguistic fractionalization. 
            The relationship between colonization and growth has also been explored by many 
researchers. European colonization, for example, has a negative impact on growth. Colonial 
heritage, measured as the identity of the Metropolitan ruler and the degree of Economic 
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Penetration (GNP/GDP), is the reason for low average growth rate of GDP per capita and the 
observed heterogeneities in Africa. This explains differences in investment–output ratio, 
education attainment and the index of ethno-linguistic fractionalization. It has also been 
established that there is a negative relationship between the number of years of colonial rule and 
growth. Also, by exploring the effect of ethnic, linguistic and religious fractionalization on the 
quality of growth, other findings are that linguistic and ethnic (racial) fractionalization are 
strongly negatively related to growth, but religious fractionalization is not (Bertocchi and 
Canova, 2002; Grier, 1999; Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Kurlat, Easterly  and Wacziarg, 2003). 
            Some other works in the area of economics of language include the explanation of the 
evolution of languages, the investigation of the economic and demographic determinants of 
destination language proficiency among immigrants and the connection of the connection 
between trade and languages. These researchers claim that trade requires language. (Rubinstein, 
1998; Chiswick, 2008; Smith, 1776). 
           While the main focus of Leeson (2005), for example, is that regardless of heterogeneity 
individuals can realize gains from trade, this chapter asserts that trade can lead to linguistic  
homogeneity in a society. In other words, if and as diverse individuals trade, the walls of 
linguistic fractionalization will eventually be lowered to the barest minimal if not utterly 
destroyed as a result of their interaction. The chapter posits that unless incidents and events such 
as destructive colonial policies that can sever the interaction of diverse individuals occur, African 
countries would have experienced an increase in trade. This increased trade would then lead to 
linguistic homogeneity.  
           Though many papers have looked at ethno-linguistic fractionalization and its effects on 
growth and development, no paper has empirically examined the determinants of ethno-linguistic 
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fractionalization. This chapter fills the gap by providing an empirical analysis of ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization using both OLS and Spatial Autoregressive model (SAR). The rest of this 
chapter is organized as follows. In the following section I examine the possibility of ethno-
linguistic fractionalization decline in Africa, followed by what exactly transpired during colonial 
rule, methodology, results, possibility of ethno-linguistic homogeneity and conclusion in sections 
2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 respectively. 
 
4.2. The Possibility of Ethno-linguistic Fractionalization Decline in Pre-colonial Africa 
4.2.1. Pre-colonial Africa and the Decline of Ethno-linguistic Fractionalization 
African countries are among the world‟s most ethnically diverse countries. According to Easterly 
and Levine (2001), African countries are among fourteen of the world‟s fifteen most ethnically 
heterogeneous societies, with Uganda being the world‟s number one. However, before 
colonization, though fractionalized, Africa was one big society with no official significant 
differences. In order to commute from one area to the other, people did not need any documents 
or permission as long as they had the means of transportation and traveled through other 
settlements peacefully.  
            Though sometimes special gifts and offerings were given to the chiefs and fetish priests 
of other societies through which one travelled or undertook business transactions, society was 
more relaxed and movement as well as assimilation into other societies and cultures was very 
common. Leeson (2005) points out how outsiders wanting to join a particular community gave 
special gifts to the Earth‟s Priests and agreed to respect the community‟s rituals (as a signal of 
credibility) and were given the possibility of trading with the existing group members. He also 
documents that this offer of gifts was rarely mandatory. 
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           This is accentuated by the fact that some languages and cultures are common to a lot of 
ethnic groups across African countries today. For example, there are at least three tribes in 
Ghana who speak same language as other tribes in Togo, Benin, Nigeria and Cote D‟Ivoire. In 
other words, this shows that interaction of different societies through trade (free trade) was 
highly possible even in the face of fractionalization.  
           Domestic, long distance and international trade developed in Africa with the resultant 
social interaction between different ethnic groups prior to European‟s arrival on the continent 
(Cohen, 1969: 6). There were also commercial interactions in pre-colonial Africa to the extent of 
creating homogeneity between different diverse people (Thornton, 1995: 194). Thus, without any 
interruption, there was the possibility that the walls of fractionalization might be lowered to their 
minimal levels if not utterly destroyed. 
            One way ethno-linguistic fractionalization could have declined in the absence of colonial 
rule is that, with time, some languages and cultures could become dominant over others in each 
society or a lingua franca could have evolved without colonial interruption. In every society, 
each group is identified with a certain kind of occupation. Typical examples are farmers, 
(including shepherds who travel widely in search of pasture), and traders. The latter are very 
influential as they move from one place to the other and must interact with the indigenous people 
in order to transact business with them. Consequently, they tend to spread their language and 
culture from place to place. Commercial interactions „help explain the great cultural similarities 
between many different peoples south of the equatorial forest‟ (Vansina, 1968: 325). 
            In Ghana, for example, out of many languages and dialects there are four dominant ones. 
One of these, Akan, is widely spoken because the ethnic group that speaks it (the Ashantis) trade 
widely and also dominate the entertainment (or music) industry, and they use their music and 
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trade to spread the use of the language in the whole country. There is hardly a Ghanaian who 
cannot speak or understand at least a word or a phrase in Akan.  Many believe that Ghana will 
one day adopt Akan as the national language. 
           There is no denying the fact that most countries that have adopted one language today 
have gone through an evolution similar to the one depicted above.  This process of evolution 
from ethno-linguistic fractionalization and others reported in some papers relating to different 
countries‟ experience could have taken place in Africa too, but this was interrupted or slowed 
down as a result of colonization. 
 
4.2.2. Cost and Benefits of Learning a New Language in Pre-colonial Africa 
Chiswick (2008) points out that language skill is human capital, since it satisfies the three 
requirements of a human capital namely productivity, costliness and embodiment in a person. 
The first two of these attributes imply that there is a benefit and cost associated with learning, 
adopting or developing a language that will serve the common good of a fractionalized society as 
Africa. If the cost is higher than the benefit, then the society or individuals who make up the 
society will stick to their different languages, instead. The opposite holds as well. 
            One of the costs of learning a dominant language or developing a common language in 
pre-colonial Africa is time; it takes time for one to learn a new language, especially so for the old 
because, the older a person is the longer and more difficult it becomes. It could also take time for 
parents and relatives to teach the young this new language, but in pre-colonial Africa where 
interaction among diverse individuals is free the process could be much more expedited than it 
was, if any, under colonial rule. Chiswick (2008) points out that exposure to the dominant 
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language is a determinant of the cost of learning the language. Apparently, this exposure was 
much easier in the absence colonial barriers and colonial immigration restriction policies. 
            Another determinant of the cost of learning a new language, according to Chiswick 
(2008) is social distance. Social distance was much smaller in pre-colonial Africa. I can still 
relate pre-colonial Africa society to some societies in Africa today. In the Volta Region of Ghana 
(Ghana was divided into nine regions by colonial masters), the dominant language is Ewe. 
Besides this language, there are many other languages. You can travel five miles away from one 
society where Ewe is spoken to another society where a different language is spoken.  But since 
this minor society can interact freely with the native Ewe speaking society, almost all of them are 
proficient in Ewe though not necessary literate (may not be able to read or write Ewe).  So the 
absence of barriers and social distance in pre-colonial Africa reduced the cost of learning a 
dominant language. 
          Another factor that determines the cost of learning a new language, as pointed out by 
Chiswick (2008), is “distance” between one‟s mother language and the dominant language. 
Though Africa has many languages, one thing these languages mostly have in common is the 
syllabus. You can almost write every language using a certain set of alphabets. There are many 
languages which have certain words in common as well. This means that it will be easy for a 
speaker of one African language to learn to speak another or most African languages. 
            One of the benefits of learning language skills is productivity. Chiswick (2008) points out 
that, language skills are productive in consumption activities. This implies that it will enable 
people to find good quality goods and services at lower prices. Trading in Africa, including 
today‟s, requires one‟s ability to negotiate prices and the more proficient you are in a trade 
language the higher your chances of success. 
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          Not only would learning a dominant language in pre-colonial Africa enable people do well 
in the market, it will also make them find good jobs in the labor market. Chiswick (2008) 
documents that, this will enable agents to execute their jobs efficiently. He also points out that 
other social benefits include one‟s ability to network and make a wide range of friends outside 
one‟s linguistic enclave and the enhancement of civic involvement by gaining full political and 
economic rights of the dominant spoken language community.  
            In pre-colonial Africa, learning the larger society‟s language could be seen as a signal of 
credibility and could result in gaining access to full benefits of the larger society. For example, 
Leeson (2005) points out that pre-colonial agents used signals such as property usage, religious 
practices and the individual‟s relationship to authority to minimize the social distance between 
sender and receiver to send their credibility to outsiders they wanted to trade with. 
             
4.3. The Worsening of Ethno-linguist Fractionalization during Colonial Rule 
Colonial rule did a lot to stymie the decline of ethno-linguistic fractionalization in Africa. Leeson 
(2005) explored the indirect effects of colonial institutions on the ability of Africans to trade 
peacefully. He explained how artificial colonial institutions such as forced allegiance to an 
authority disabled the signal that individuals look to when evaluating the credibility of outsiders  
to trade, which  resulted in the creation of smaller sub-groups among broader ones to eliminate 
the risk of interacting with those who are remotely unknown. Thus this colonial distortion of 
trade further reduced social and commercial interaction that would expose individuals to and 
cause them to learn a trade language. 
         Second, colonial rule inhibited free movement of individuals in Africa and this was no 
environment for culture or linguistic convergence. Leeson (2005) points out that as opposed to 
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pre-colonial Africa where people could come and go as they pleased, so that it was possible for 
people to be members of multiple communities and hence exchange with a wide range of 
individuals, colonial land policy created noise in this signal used to convey credibility by legally 
requiring colonial agents to stay attached to their ruler-allocated areas of land. Such a colonial 
policy also restricted migration as was the case of Basutoland in 1903 when colonial law forbade 
the provision of land to non-Basotho people.  
            Limited mobility under colonial rule was therefore one of the factors that reduced the 
need to adopt or learn the most widely spoken language(s) as the cost of doing so became more 
than the benefit, if any. 
          Another way colonization exacerbated ethno-linguistic fractionalization in Africa is that 
colonial masters separated African countries into territories which may never be reconciled to 
each other, perhaps, forever. The separation has far reaching consequences of maintaining ethno-
linguistic borders especially across countries. As mentioned above, different African countries 
societies with common languages and cultures have now been divided by walls of colonization. 
Societies, who once saw themselves as one, though far apart, because of language and culture, 
now see each other as aliens.  
            Though the walls of ethno-linguistic fractionalization may gradually break down in each 
colony (now country) it may never break down across countries. This is because these colonies 
are now trained to see one another as different entities. For example, the people from the Volta 
Region of Ghana speak the same language and have same culture as about half the population of 
Togo, but are considered strangers in Togo and treated as such. On the other hand, this Volta 
Region of Ghana speaks totally a different language and has somewhat different culture from 
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some regions of Ghana. The same is true of Akan (the most widely spoken language in Ghana) 
speaking Ivorians.  
           Moreover, colonization led to the proliferation of different institutions in Africa that made 
it difficult to reduce fractionalization. Leeson (2005) points out that, colonial created institutions 
severed the communication mechanism between socially heterogeneous individuals in Africa by 
reducing the signals (pre-colonial institutions) that enabled communication and interaction as 
this increased the cost of commercial interaction. Legal systems of each colonial Master are 
different and this made it difficult for Africa to adopt an institutional framework that supported 
continent-wide development initiatives such as free trade areas. These legal frameworks that 
distorted the already established ones before them helped perpetuate ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization. 
           Colonial rulers made matters worse by again dividing their colonies into regions and 
districts which still persist today. This was an attempt to facilitate colonial rule but now 
permanently left these internal groups at conflict with each other over lands, resources and 
domains. Leeson (2005) documents that colonial policy led to a break-down of the ability of 
African people to interact freely and, instead, led to a sharp increase in property disputes among 
 Africans under colonialism. 
            Finally, one would have thought that the introduction of the language of the colonist 
should mitigate linguistic fractionalization but what happened was the exact opposite. Unlike 
Latin America where Spanish was imposed by colonial masters and everyone was supposed to 
learn this language, the introduction of the language of the colonist was intended for only a few 
selected Africans, who helped in the facilitation of communication of the colonial masters with 
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the Africans. Specifically, the introduction of these languages was just to serve the means of the 
colonial masters in extracting from the continent. 
            One way this could have turned out to help Africa was that when a larger population of 
each country gets to learn the colonial master‟s language, it could help to promote homogeneity. 
However, one could only learn this language (official language) through formal education, which 
is costly. Only the very rich could afford this formal education. Easterly and Levine (1997) 
document that more than 90 percent of the population in most African countries does not speak 
the official language at home. In other words, these official languages tend to add to linguistic 
diversity in Africa rather than help in creating homogeneity.  
           The whole of Africa was not colonized by colonial masters speaking the same language. 
This means that ranging from the British to the Portuguese; four or  more languages were added 
to the several languages spoken in Africa rather than replace them (a situation that would have 
helped linguistic fractionalization in Africa). If a greater proportion, if not all, of the population 
of Africa countries were able to speak its colonial master‟s language the outcome would have 
been close to desirable. 
            Post-colonial attempts to use the colonial master‟s language to reduce linguistic 
fractionalization in Africa did not result in anything different from failure. Most African 
countries made it mandatory for every school going person to learn the official language 
(colonial master‟s language) of another African country. An example is Ghana, which has all its 
neighbors colonized by France and hence speak French. Hence, every Ghanaian in high school 
was made to learn French after the mid 80‟s.   
            This project, however, did not seem to achieve the intended goal – to enable the average 
educated Ghanaian to communicate with citizens of neighboring countries who happen to speak 
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French. The main reason for this failure is again attributable to the scars of colonization – 
colonial barriers. Bertocchi and Canova (2002) document that the impact of colonization may 
survive past political independence and those colonies kept paying the consequences of their 
history even after independence was achieved. 
            Due to these colonial barriers, which has now become official barriers, even if one learns 
the neighbors‟ language he could do little with it (because hardly does anyone speak that 
language in Ghana) and hence tend to forget it a few years after leaving school. If there were no 
official barriers and people could travel freely to neighboring countries, say, to trade continuous 
use of the neighbors language could cause them to be proficient not only in their own official 
language, but also in the language of their neighboring countries. 
            Cameroon is an example of the possibility of speaking a second official language in the 
absence of colonial barriers. One part of Cameroon was colonized by the French and the other by 
the British. However, since these two regions do not have any official barriers, most 
Cameroonians who speak French also speak English and vice versa, though they may not be 
equally proficient in both. This is because there is a free interaction between these two parts of 
Cameroon and as they trade or conduct any commercial activities they put into use the official 
languages they learnt at school thereby becoming more proficient in both. This same example 
may be true in the case of Canada. 
 
4.4. Methodology 
4.4.1. Data 
This study estimates the impact of colonial rule (number of years of colonial rule) on ethno-
linguistic fractionalization. The data comprises a cross-section of 46 African countries from 
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1980-2000. Data on ethno-linguistic fractionalization is taken from two sources. The first one is 
the measure of linguistic fractionalization computed by Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Kurlat, 
Easterly  and Wacziarg (2003).  This variable is based on the shares of languages spoken as 
mother tongues. The reason for the choice of this variable is that it is entirely based on language 
and hence different from the effect of any racial or ethnic features.  
            Even though the reason for the separation of this variable by Alesina, Devleeschauwer, 
Kurlat, Easterly  and Wacziarg (2003) was to show that in some cases ethnic fractionalization 
matters more for growth than just language diversity, in most of their main regression linguistic 
fractionalization does have a bigger effect (and higher level of significance) on growth than 
ethnic fractionalization. I thus employ both this variable and ethno-linguistic fractionalization in 
my regressions. 
          The ethno-linguistic measure is taken from ELF Dataset, which is compiled by researchers 
at the Miklukho-Maklai Ethnological Institute in the Soviet Union based on the probability that 
two randomly selected individuals in a country will belong to different ethno-linguistic groups. 
This data is available for 1961. Easterly and Levine (2001) document that many researchers 
including geolinguistics use this dataset. 
            The population, GNP and GDP data are taken from the World Bank‟s databases. One of 
the measures of colonial rule, colonial penetration (also referred to as “drain”) is the ratio of a 
country‟s GNP to GDP in 1960 as in Bertocchi and Canova (2002). The lower the value of  GNP 
the higher the level of colonial penetration and the lower the ratio. They use this as a measure of 
colonial drain following the drain of wealth thesis. According to them this measure captures how 
colonial surplus was further extracted by Metropolitan countries by reducing indigenous capital 
accumulation through repatriation of profits, pensions, interest on loans and salaries.  
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            Institutional measures are taken from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). Data 
on colonial rule is taken from the World Fact Book. The length of colonization was compiled 
based on Barro (1991) which provides data including dates of independence. A detailed 
description of the data, together with summary measures is given in Appendix 5.  
 
4.4.2. Model 
Both OLS and a spatial econometric model, SAR (Spatial Autoregressive Model) are employed. 
SAR specifies a country‟s ethno-linguistic fractionalization as a function of the weighted value 
of the ethno-linguistic fractionalization of its geographic neighbors. The models are specified 
below: 
 
OLS: 
 
 
where,  is the number of years a country has been colonized,  is the volume of 
bilateral trade between an African country and all other African countries,  is the 
index of political stability in a country and  equals 1 if a country‟s post colonial borders 
existed before colonial rule and zero otherwise. Colonial rule is expected to have positive impact 
on ethno-linguistic fractionalization.  
 
SAR: 
 tttt XWYY                                                                       (2)    
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where tX  is a vector of controls variables specified above, tY  is an NX1 vector of measures of 
the dependent variables;   is the spatial autoregressive and spatial error coefficients (which 
represents geographic contagion in the dependent variable), and t  and t  are  NX1 matrixes of 
iid random errors. W  is an NXN weight matrix for geographic neighbors. 
            For the geographic weight matrix, I use the “queen” case of first order contiguity. Thus a 
country gives a weight of one to every country it shares a border with (whether vertically, 
horizontally or at vertex contacts) and zero otherwise. The geographic weight matrix is row 
standardized. In other words the weight given by each country to geographic neighbors is 
calculated as a ratio of 1 to the total number of countries that each country shares neighbors with.  
For example, if country A has 4 neighbors, then each of these countries is assigned a weight of ¼ 
by country A.   
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This makes the weights given by each country to all others sum up to 1. This is represented in 
matrix notations above. 
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            To use the SAR approach, I will first test for the presence of spatial dependence using the 
Lagrangian Multiplier (LM) test which shows whether OLS estimates would be biased and also 
helps to chose the best spatial model (the one with the largest LM t-statistic). 
 
4.5. Results 
4.5.1. Main Findings 
The results suggest that the number of years of colonial rule in an African country affects both 
the country‟s volume level of linguistic fractionalization and ethno-linguistic fractionalization.  
            Table 3.1 shows that the impact of colonial rule on ethno-linguistic fractionalization and 
linguistic fractionalization is positive. The OLS regression results show that they are significant 
at 5% and 10% respectively. The significance of these results however depends on whether we 
control for institutions or not. For linguistic fractionalization, without controlling for institutions 
the number of years of colonial rule is insignificant. However, once I control for institutions both 
the number of years of colonial rule and institutions become significant. For ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization, the result flips; the number of years of colonial rule becomes insignificant 
when I control for institutions.  
           This could mean that while the number years of colonial rule matters for linguistic 
fractionalization and ethno-linguistic fractionalization, the effect of the number of years of 
colonial rule on linguistic fractionalization is exacerbated in face in the presence of weak 
institutions.  
            Similarly the colonial history dummies are significant in the linguistic fractionalization 
regressions only after controlling for institutions. The results (in both Table 3.1 and Table 3.2) 
suggest that British and French colonization worsened linguistic fractionalization in Africa. 
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British colonization however, appears to reduce ethno-linguistic fractionalization when we do 
not control for institutions. This is shown in Table 3.1. Thus while British colonization seem to 
exacerbate linguistic fractionalization, it reduces ethno-linguistic fractionalization.  A possible 
explanation for this could be that since the British practice a divide and rule system, it was able 
to merge different ethnic groups into one society creating an artificial ethnic group of many 
ethnic groups thereby replacing many natural ethnic groups by few artificial ones. However, 
people were not forced to abandon their native languages the way they were forced to be 
separated from their societies. Placing different ethnicities into one society (or now country) then 
increased the linguistic fractionalization in those societies as explained earlier. 
           Tangential to the above, colonial penetration is significant in all regression in Table 3.1 
and Table 3.2. The results show that countries which have high level of “drain” (low colonial 
penetration ratio) are more fractionalized that countries which have low levels of  “drain”. 
           In Table 3.2, I report the results for the SAR model. The main aim of this regression is to 
find out if there is a spatial dependence in the dependent variables; that is if countries which have 
high levels of linguistic fractionalization or ethno-linguistic fractionalization tend to be 
neighbors. The result shows that linguistic fractionalization is contagious while ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization is not. This is evident in the coefficient of rho being significant in the SAR 
regression for linguistic fractionalization as opposed to ethno-linguistic fractionalization. A 
possible reason for why the latter is not contagious is that ethnic groups are exogenous and they 
emerge rather than are created. Languages, however, can be created, adopted, spread or 
dominated. 
            Controlling for spatial dependence also made all the independent variables, except 
colonial penetration, insignificant. This can be explained by the fact that all the independent 
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variables are spatially correlated. All of them are measures of colonial rule and are directly 
related to colonial. Thus the geographic weight matrix therefore captures and removes this 
spatial correlation making these variables insignificant. Colonial penetration (GNP/GDP), the 
only independent variable significant is an indirect measure of colonial rule. Thus, we are still 
able to capture the indirect effect of colonial penetration on both measures of fractionalization. 
             Finally institutions seem to matter for linguistic fractionalization but not ethno-linguistic 
fraction fractionalization. This supports Leeson (2005) that bad institutions exacerbate 
fractionalization. Controlling for institutions in the linguistic fractionalization regressions makes 
the measures of colonization significant and the coefficients of rho significant in Table 3.1 and 
Table 3.2 respectively. This can be explained by the fact that while people can change their 
language or adopt other languages, it is difficult for them, if not impossible, to change their 
ethnicity or race no matter how good institutions become. This ethnicity (racial) component in 
the ethno-linguistic fractionalization measure makes it insensitive or inversely sensitive to 
institutions. 
 
4.6. Is there a Possibility of Linguistic Homogeneity in Post-colonial Africa? 
4.6.1. Political and or Economic Integration 
Though one cannot say for certain whether ethno-linguistic fractions can reduce enough in 
Africa after the harms caused by colonial rule, looking at what is going on other continents 
suggests that there is a possibility. Chiswick (2008) documents that English is becoming a 
“lingua franca” in Europe following the reduction of legal barriers that now facilitates the 
movement of people and the removal of non-tariff and tariff barriers that facilitates the free 
mobility of goods (trade) across EU countries. 
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            If this EU paragon could be epitomized in Africa, free trade and free mobility of 
economic agents could call for, if not result in, a lingua franca. While this conclusion is feasible I 
do not want to hasten to suggest what language that would be. While such an economic 
integration alone could work the magic that could have happened in an uninterrupted pre-
colonial Africa the choice of this new language now may be easier in the presence political 
integration as well, where individuals would view the speaking of such language as a sign of 
demonstrating patriotism or nationalism.  
            This though, in my view will be more difficult than, if not as difficult as, implementing 
an economic integration. In other words there are benefits as well as costs associated with 
achieving linguistic homogeneity now as, if not more than, it was in pre-colonial Africa. 
 
4.6.2. Costs and Benefits of Implementing Policies that could Reduce Ethno-linguistic 
Fractionalization 
The costs associated with implementing an economic integration that will increase free mobility 
of people and goods in Africa today should not be different from similar ones executed in other 
parts of the world. Most governments will fear the loss of revenues such as customs duties 
(export duties and import duties). However, governments can make up for this by increasing 
excise duties such as production taxes, sales taxes, value added taxes, and sin tax, among others.  
            Another problem is that most African countries are among the most corrupt countries in 
the world, and top government officials who have a stake in these duties may rather prefer these 
colonial barriers, now official barriers to stay. Suffice it to mention here that attempts to establish 
economic unions such as the Economic Union of West African States (ECOWAS) have been 
underway for some time now. 
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           Another cost some Africans would have to bear in promoting one language on the 
continent or in their countries (if one is to be chosen instead of a dominant one or a few 
dominant ones emerging naturally) will be to let go their language for another country‟s. While 
Chiswick (2008) implies that becoming proficient in the wider society‟s language does not (and 
should not) give rise to negative connotations about one‟s own language or culture, the 
temptation to see it that way could be minimized if economic integration comes with political 
integration where all members see all resources of the union, including the chosen language, as 
belonging to everyone in the in union. 
           Other costs of linguistic homogeneity include the cost of schooling (to non-native 
speakers of the chosen language) needed to learn such a language unless it naturally evolved. If 
this comes with a political integration, it should be possible for the central government to 
sponsor such training and education. 
            Benefits associated with linguistic homogeneity in Africa include all the benefits 
mentioned above (obtainable in pre-colonial setting) and the following. Chiswick (2008) 
suggests that adopting the language of a larger community imply that one would be exposed a 
wide range of opportunities including economic, social and civic opportunities. This means that 
ethno-linguistic homogeneity in Africa will make an average African, who once was limited to 
the facilities of its small country will now have a choice where to live and or work. 
           Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Kurlat, Easterly and Wacziarg (2003) find that linguistic 
fractionalization is strongly negatively related to growth. This means that policies, such as 
economic integration and political integration, that will reduce linguistic fractionalization in 
Africa will increase growth as well. That means, though some people will have to give up their 
language, this will lead to economic development.  
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            This chapter finds a positive relationship between colonization (including colonial 
barriers) in African countries and ethno-linguistic fractionalization. This means that polices such 
as the removal of colonial (trade) barriers will increase trade, reduce linguistic fractionalization 
which will in turn increase growth in Africa. This is the main focus or argument of this chapter. 
 
4.7. Conclusion 
The findings of this chapter show that the length of colonization actually worsened the 
prevalence of linguistic fractionalization and ethno-linguistic fractionalization in Africa instead 
of mitigating it. This is supported by the results of this chapter which show that the number of 
years a country was colonized has a positive impact on the linguistic and ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization of the country. 
           The results also support the view of Leeson (2005) that bad institutions worsen 
fractionalization and that this is the reason for the increasing fractionalization and poor growth in 
Africa. Apart from the division of the continent into colonies, different foreign languages and 
institutions introduced by colonial rulers made it difficult for Africa to integrate. The chapter 
suggests that the success of Africa in mitigating or eradicating the effects of linguistic 
fractionalization and ethno-linguistic fractionalization in Africa depends on the emergence of 
economic and political integration of the continent.  
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Table 3.1. OLS (with and without institutions) 
       Notes: t-statistics in parentheses; asterisks indicate significance as follows: ***=1%, **=5%, *=10%.  
       Variable description, descriptive statistics, and sources can be found in Appendix 5. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Dependent  Variable 
 
 
 
 
Independent   
Variable 
 
 
Ethno-Linguistic 
Fractionalization 
 
Linguistic 
Fractionalization 
 
Ethno-Linguistic 
Fractionalization 
 
Linguistic 
Fractionalization 
 
Constant 
284.697** * 
(3.98) 
2.910** * 
(3.65) 
251.409*** 
(-0.18) 
1.626** 
(2.23) 
Colonial Rule 
(no. of year) 
0.208 
(1.62) 
0.003**  
(2.14) 
0.140* 
(1.67) 
0.0002 
(0.25) 
 
Institutions 
-5.153 
(-0.76) 
-0.202 *** 
(-2.63) 
  
 
Colonial  
Penetration 
-2.222*** 
(-3.04) 
-0.025*** 
(-3.21) 
-1.890*** 
(-3.47) 
-0.013* 
(-1.73) 
British Colonial 
Dummy  
-15.526 
(-0.87) 
0.642** 
(1.99) 
-24.043* 
(1.67) 
0.306 
(1.03) 
French Colonial 
Dummy 
1.684 
(0.11) 
0.554* 
(1.78) 
-3.888 
(-0.31) 
0.336 
(1.13) 
Belgium Colonial 
Dummy 
-3.078 
(-0.15) 
0.338 
(0.79) 
-4.257 
(-0.22) 
0.263 
(0.73) 
 
Border dummy 
-2.756 
(-0.27) 
0.030 
(0.20) 
-5.001 
(-0.52) 
-0.063 
( -0.40) 
 
R-Squared 
 
0.26 
 
0.35 
 
0.24 
 
0.15 
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Table 3.2. SAR (with and without institutions) 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses; asterisks indicate significance as follows: ***=1%, **=5%, *=10% 
Variable description, descriptive statistics, and sources can be found in Appendix 5. 
. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent  Variable 
 
 
Independent   
Variable 
 
Spatial Error Model (SAR) 
Linguistic 
Fractionalization 
Ethno-Linguistic 
Fractionalization 
Linguistic 
Fractionalization 
Ethno-Linguistic 
Fractionalization 
 
Constant 
0.246 
(1.595) 
40.984** * 
(2.778) 
0.246* 
(1.710) 
48.862*** 
(3.458) 
 
Rho 
0.317*** 
(2.49) 
0.025 
(0.193) 
0.312*** 
(2.424) 
0.051 
(0.384) 
Colonial Rule 
(no. of year) 
0.0005 
(1.065) 
0.026 
(0.661) 
0.0004 
(1.081) 
0.041 
(1.033) 
 
Institutions 
-0.002 
(-0.039) 
6.263 
(1.55) 
 
 
 
Colonial  
Penetration 
 -0.0004 
(-0.400) 
0.045 
(0.482) 
-0.0004 
(-0.399) 
0.023 
(0.245) 
British Colonial 
Dummy  
0.251* 
(1.75) 
 -12.604 
(-0.949) 
0.249** 
(1.945) 
-3.564 
(-0.293) 
French Colonial 
Dummy 
0.210* 
(1.62) 
  5.778 
(0.478) 
0.209* 
(1.671) 
10.661 
(0.894) 
Belgium Colonial 
Dummy 
-0.028 
(-0.146) 
6.778 
(0.371) 
-0.028 
(-0.144) 
5.672 
(0.303) 
 
Border dummy 
0.027 
(0.270) 
0.024 
(0.194) 
0.027 
(0.270) 
3.445 
(0.36) 
 
R-Squared 
 
0.17 
 
0.12 
 
0.17 
 
0.08 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
Conclusion 
 
The dissertation focuses on economic contagion in financial and international development. Each 
chapter is based on an idea in either in financial economics or international economics or both. 
The main channels of contagion found in this study are trade, geography and financial linkages. 
            Chapter 2 explores contagion in exchange market pressure, currency crisis and currency 
stability and identifies trade linkages, geographic linkages and financial markets as the channels 
of contagion. It models contagion using two spatial econometric models namely spatial error 
mode and spatial autoregressive model. A panel of 119 countries is considered in this chapter. It 
finds that trade linkages are more effective channels of contagion than geography in currency 
crisis, currency stability and exchange market pressure in general.  
             The findings of chapter 2 also suggests that there stable currency periods are more 
contagious than crisis periods. This implies that enforcing trade will do more good than harm to 
a country. Another significant contribution of this chapter is that, though trade, is the major 
channel of contagion in currency crisis, the geographic channel should not be ignored. It suggests 
that the geography channel or effect help explain why currency crises are largely regional.  
            Chapter 3 estimates contagion in financial development both at levels and at first 
difference. Using spatial error model the paper investigate whether financial development is 
contagious. The chapter investigates whether changes of financial development are contagious. 
The channels of contagion in this chapter are trade, geography and financial linkages. It finds 
that financial linkages are a better channel of transmission than trade and geography. The 
findings of the chapter also confirm those of other studies that legal uncertainty and bureaucratic 
delays also determine financial development. 
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            Chapter 4 attempts to examine what has made it difficult for a single language to spread 
through the African continent or for the evolution of a lingua franca in Africa. It explains that 
trade would have been the main means by which this could have happened, but the process got 
interrupted by colonial rule. It explains that while Pre-colonial Africa would have faced costs 
and benefits in adopting a single language, the benefits did outweigh the costs. However, 
colonization increased the cost and this makes it difficult, if not impossible, for post-colonial 
Africa to reduce their levels of ethno-linguistic fractionalization or linguistic fractionalization, 
important determinants of growth. It suggests that the only way the process could get restored is 
a political and or economic integration of African countries. These recommendations are 
however not without a cost and it may take a reasonably long time for Africans to pay the price 
in order to reap the benefits of integration. 
            In conclusion, the dissertation finds that, trade, financial linkages and geography are very 
important transmission mechanisms of contagious economic events. Addressing these channels 
strategically can minimize the spread of negative shocks and the costs they bring and maximize 
the spread of positive economic shocks and lead to an increased growth of countries around the 
world, especially developing countries. In other words, strong economic unions as well as trade 
liberalization in physical assets and financial assets can be important tools used especially by 
poor countries to harness, attract, or catch the positive externalities coming from other countries 
around them. These same tools can be used to repel, reduce, neutralize or undo negative 
spillovers countries would otherwise have to consume in the world community.  
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Appendix 1: Variable Description, Descriptive Statistics, and Sources for chapter 3 
Variable Name (source) Description Mean (std) 
Dependent Variables: 
 
EMP - Exchange market 
Pressure (2) 
 
Currency Crises (2) 
 
Currency Stability (2) 
  
Exchange Rate (2) 
 
 
Independent 
Variables: 
Current Account (2) 
 
Domestic Credit (1) 
 
 
M2 (1) 
 
CPI (1) 
 
GDP Growth (1) 
 
Unemployment (1) 
 
Geographic 
Neighbors(4) 
 
 
A linear combination of exchange rates and 
international reserves                                    
  
Excess EMP (%)                                                
 
Absolute Value EMP shortfall (%) 
 
Official exchange rate (LCU per DM, period 
average) 
 
 
 
Annual current account per GDP (%) 
 
Annual growth rate of Domestic credit provided 
by banking sector per GDP (%) 
 
Money and quasi money  to total reserve ratio  
  
Annual growth of consumer Prices (% ) 
 
Annual growth rate of GDP (%) 
 
Unemployment, total (% of total labor force) 
 
Number of neighbors a country has based on 
first-order contiguity 
 
 
0.767 (25.484) 
 
 
2.400 (13.822) 
 
0.013 (0.020) 
 
 
 
 
-3.418 (6.359) 
 
-3.681 (83.069) 
 
 
11.155 (45.362) 
 
 
 
0.375 (6.192) 
 
4.203 (5.527) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. World Development Indicator; The World Bank Databases 
2. Direction Of Trade; IMF Databases 
3. International Financial Statistics, IMF Databases 
4. CIA, The World Fact Book 
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           Appendix 2: List of Countries for chapter 3 
Afghanistan, Islamic Republic of 
Albania 
Algeria 
Argentina 
Australia 
Austria 
Bangladesh 
Belgium 
Benin 
Bolivia 
Brazil 
Bulgaria 
Burkina Faso 
Burundi 
Cameroon 
Canada 
Chile 
China, P.R.: Mainland 
Colombia 
Congo, Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Republic of 
Costa Rica 
Côte d'Ivoire 
Cuba 
Cyprus 
Czech Republic 
Denmark 
Dominican Republic 
Ecuador 
Egypt 
El Salvador 
Equatorial Guinea 
Estonia 
Ethiopia 
Fiji 
Finland 
France 
Gabon 
Gambia, The 
Georgia 
Germany 
 
 
Ghana  
Greece 
Guatemala 
Guinea 
Guyana 
Haiti 
Honduras 
China, P.R.: Hong  
  Kong 
Hungary 
Iceland 
India 
Indonesia 
Iran, Islamic 
  Republic of 
Iraq 
Ireland 
Israel 
Italy 
Jamaica 
Japan 
Jordan 
Kenya 
Korea, Democratic  
  People's Rep. of 
Korea, Republic of 
Lebanon 
Liberia 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Malaysia 
Mali 
Mauritania 
Mauritius 
Mexico 
Mongolia 
Morocco 
Mozambique 
Myanmar 
Nepal 
Netherlands 
 
 
New Zealand  
Nicaragua 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Norway 
Oman 
Pakistan 
Panama 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Philippines 
Poland 
Portugal 
Romania 
Russian Federation 
Rwanda 
Saudi Arabia 
Senegal 
Serbia and Montenegro 
Sierra Leone 
Singapore 
Somalia 
South Africa 
Spain 
Sri Lanka 
Sudan 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Tanzania 
Thailand 
Togo 
Trinidad and Tobago 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
United Kingdom 
United States 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
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      Appendix 3: Variable Description, Descriptive Statistics, and Sources for chapter 4 
Variable  
Name (source) 
 
Description 
Mean (Std. 
Dev.) 
Dependent Variables: 
 
Financial Development –  
Private Credit to 
the Private Sector 
(1) 
 
 
 
 
Independent Variables: 
 
Per Capita Income (1) 
 
Bureaucratic Quality  (5)                 
 
Risk of Expropriation (5) 
 
 
Risk of repudiation of      
contracts (5) 
 
Legal  Environment   (5)              
 
 
Geographic Neighbors(4) 
 
Trade Partners (2) 
 
FDI Partners (3) 
 
 
Domestic Credit to the Private Sector (% GDP) 
 
Stock  Market Total  Value Traded  (% GDP) 
 
Private Credit  by the Banking Sector  (% GDP) 
 
 
 
 
 
GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$) 
 
Index of bureaucratic (1-10): The higher the better. 
 
Index of the risk of outright confiscation of private 
investment (1-10). The higher the better. 
 
Index of changes in government and or its behavior 
(1-10). The higher the better. 
 
Index of legal uncertainty. Sum of the risks of 
expropriation and repudiation of contracts (2-20). 
The higher the lower the legal uncertainty. 
A country‟s neighbor based on queen first order 
contiguity criteria 
Countries that engage in bilateral trade 
 
Countries that receive FDI inflows from each other 
 
 
0.473(0.384) 
 
25.052(32.749) 
 
0.805(3.140) 
 
 
 
 
 
7.0341e+003 
(8.9556e+003) 
3.304(1.743) 
 
7.239(2.796) 
 
 
6.602(2.778) 
 
 
13.841(5.502) 
 
 
1. World Development Indicator; The World Bank Databases 
2. Direction Of Trade; IMF Databases 
3. OECD Databases 
4. CIA, The World Fact Book 
5. International Country Risk Guide; ICRG Dataset 
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                  Appendix 4: List of Countries for chapter 4 
 
Algeria 
Argentina 
Australia 
Austria 
Bahamas, The 
Bahrain 
Bangladesh 
Barbados 
Belgium 
Belize 
Benin 
Bolivia 
Brazil 
Burundi 
Cameroon 
Canada 
Chile 
China 
Czech Republic 
Colombia 
Congo, Dem. 
Rep. 
Congo, Rep. 
Costa Rica 
Cote d'Ivoire 
Cyprus 
Denmark 
Dominican 
Republic 
Ecuador 
Egypt, Arab 
Rep. 
El Salvador 
Fiji 
Finland 
France 
Gabon 
 
 
 
Germany 
Ghana 
Greece 
Guatemala 
Haiti 
Honduras 
Hong Kong, 
China 
Hungary 
Iceland 
India 
Indonesia 
Iran, Islamic 
Rep. 
Ireland 
Israel 
Italy 
Jamaica 
Japan 
Jordan 
Kenya 
Korea, Rep. 
Kuwait 
Luxemburg 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Malaysia 
Mali 
Malta 
Mauritius 
Mexico 
Morocco 
Myanmar 
Nepal 
Netherlands 
New Zealand 
Nicaragua 
 
 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Norway 
Pakistan 
Panama 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Philippines 
Portugal 
Senegal 
Sierra Leone 
Singapore 
Slovakia 
South Africa 
Spain 
Sri Lanka 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Tanzania 
Thailand 
Togo 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
Uganda 
United Kingdom 
United Arab 
Emirates 
Uruguay 
United States 
Venezuela, RB 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
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 Appendix 5: Variable Description, Descriptive Statistics, and Sources 
Variable Name (source) Description Mean (Std. Dev.) 
Dependent Variables: 
 
Linguistic Fractionalization(3) 
Ethno-linguistic Fractionalization(6) 
 
 
Independent Variables: 
 
Colonial Penetration(1)  
 
 
Institution  (5)                 
 
 
 
 
Colonial Rule (4)              
 
 
Border dummy 
 
Colonial Dummy 
 
 
Index of linguistic diversity (%) 
Index of ethnic and linguistic diversity (% ) 
 
 
 
GNP/GDP computed for 1960: The lower the value 
the higher the extent of colonial penetration or 
drain. 
Index of institutional quality computed as an 
average of  three variables (bureaucratic quality, 
risk of expropriation, and the risk of repudiation of  
contracts ):  (1-10); the higher the better. 
 
Number of years a country has been colonized by 
all possible colonial Masters (years) 
 
A dummy specifying whether a country‟s borders 
were created by colonial masters 
 
A dummy showing which colonial master 
colonized a country 
 
 
0.623(0.291) 
0.616(0.26707) 
 
 
 
 
98.993(4.341) 
 
 
2.327(0.993) 
 
 
 
 
 
106.065(120.9877) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. World Development Indicator; The World Bank Databases 
2. Direction Of Trade; IMF Databases 
3. Alesina et al. (2003) Dataset 
4. CIA, The World Fact Book 
5. International Country Risk Guide; ICRG Dataset 
6. Elf Dataset 
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                   Appendix 6: List of Countries 
 
Algeria 
Angola 
Benin 
Burkina Faso 
Burundi 
Cameroon 
Cape Verde 
Central African Republic 
Chad 
Comoros 
Congo, Rep.  
Of the  
Congo, Dem.  
Rep. Of the  
Cote d'lvoire 
Djibouti 
Egypt  
 
 
Equatorial 
Guinea  
Ethiopia  
Gabon 
Gambia, The  
Ghana 
Guinea 
Guinea-
Bissau 
Kenya 
Liberia 
Libya 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Malawi 
Mauritania 
Mauritius 
 
 
Morocco 
Mozambiqe 
Niger 
Nigeria  
Rwanda 
Senegal 
Sierra 
Leone 
Somalia 
South 
Africa 
Sudan   
Tanzania 
Togo  
Tunisia 
Uganda 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
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